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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Cryptographic algorithms have always relied on stored keys for the 
provision of security services. Since these keys are stored on a system this makes 
them prone to attack. Efforts to increase the key size makes brute forcing difficult 
but does not eliminate key theft.  
This thesis proposes a comprehensive security framework for groups of 
devices. The research makes four major contributions to improve the security of 
devices in the multiparty environment. The proposed framework uses the novel 
Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) technology which proposes utilizing 
measurable properties and features of a device to create a device identification. 
This device identification called the ICMetric is used to create cryptographic keys 
which are then used in the designed cryptosystems. 
The first contribution of the thesis is the creation of an ICMetric using 
sensors found in modern smart devices. The research explores both explicit and 
implicit features which can be used to generate of an ICMetric. 
The second contribution of this research is the creation of a group ICMetric 
which is computed using the device ICMetric. The computation of the device 
ICMetric is a particular challenge as it has to be computed without violating the 
properties of the ICMetric technology. 
The third contribution is the demonstration that an ICMetric can be used 
for the creation of symmetric key. The fourth contribution of this research is an 
efficient RSA based asymmetric key generation scheme for the multiparty 
environment. 
iv 
 
Designing a system using widely accepted cryptographic primitives does 
not guarantee a secure system therefore the security of proposed schemes has 
been studied under the standard model. The schemes presented in this thesis 
attempt to improve the security of devices in the group environment. The schemes 
demonstrate that key theft deterrent technologies can be incorporated into 
cryptographic schemes to offer higher levels of security and privacy. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Recently, there has been a visible reduction in the cost of computing which 
has resulted in the creation of new venues that utilize computers in their various 
forms. In their early years, computers were standalone devices which could 
process data when it was provided to them. Emergence of energy efficient radio 
technologies resulted in the creation of autonomous communication systems like 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN’s) [1][2]. WSN’s relied on using leaf nodes which 
could sense a stimulus and forward the information to the base node [3]. After 
the emergence of WSN’s, research was geared towards providing security to the 
sensor node, data and communications of the network. WSN’s were primarily 
designed to operate as a standalone network of sensors. The emergence of internet 
and smart devices caused WSN’s to evolve into more intelligent environments 
where devices could sense and communicate what is happening around them and 
then forward that information via the internet. The Internet of Things [4] is one 
such environment which aims to create a collaboration between devices for 
generating, processing and sharing data. The popularity of Internet of Things and 
the general appeal of collaborative environments means that in the future, devices 
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will be increasingly functioning in a group and less as standalone devices. Many 
of these devices will sense, process, store and communicate data of sensitive 
nature. 
Secrecy of sensitive data is an important requirement especially when the 
data is being communicated beyond the confines of the device. The Cambridge 
dictionary [5] defines cryptography as the practice of creating and understanding 
codes that keep information secret. Ensuring secrecy and privacy has become a 
complex task as adversaries possess resources and the capability of exploiting 
weakness in a system. A fundamental problem in cryptography is how to 
communicate securely in the presence of adversaries. This problem has become 
even more important with the proliferation of ubiquitous smart devices, Internet 
of Things and group communications. Often adversaries exploit design weaknesses 
to gain illegitimate access to a system. Such types of attacks can be difficult to 
correct as a solution may lie in redesigning of the system. A problem that has 
plagued the field of cryptography is key theft. An attack on the cryptographic 
keys can be sufficient to compromise the system. 
1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Today there are more devices than the number of users on the internet. 
This means many of us have more than one device which connects us to the 
internet. As everyday objects like televisions and watches become internet capable 
the importance of security cannot be denied. Despite constant research in the 
field of cryptography, computation devices are still insecure. Numerous computer 
security incidents are reported every year in which systems are attacked resulting 
in financial loss, data theft and even threat to life [6]. With easy availability of 
computation power and increased connectivity adversaries are now stronger than 
ever before. For an adversary the motivation behind an attack could be to 
compromise national security or to just create a low level nuisance. 
1.2 THESIS STATEMENT 
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Emergence of high capacity networks has created many new applications 
like teleconferencing, real-time information services and collaborative 
environments which follow the group communication model. In this model one or 
more authorized senders send messages to one or more authorized receivers. 
Numerous devices are already being marketed for the Internet of Things 
environment. The devices function collaboratively to enable the sharing of data 
and information. A recent detailed study [7] shows that devices in the Internet of 
Things are insecure and often lack the resources required for the provision of 
security. To an adversary the group communication presents an attractive 
environment which is abundant in devices and communication links. Hence 
adversaries will attempt to gain access by exploiting flaws in security or system 
design. Security schemes and protocols that require a cryptographic key assume 
that the key is kept secret. This assumption alone is a weakness in any 
cryptosystem as there are many ways for an adversary to capture the keys. If an 
unencrypted cryptographic key is captured then the security of the system is 
compromised. Thus cryptographic key theft is an Achilles Heel for any security 
based system. The fact that an attack on cryptographic keys can lead to failed 
security creates the impending case for a renewed approach for the provision of 
security in group environments. 
1.2 THESIS STATEMENT 
Cryptographic schemes are based on publically available protocols and 
algorithms while the security keys are kept secret. Hence the security of a system 
lies in keeping the keys secret and not the underlying protocol. If at any point 
the keys are captured then the system can be compromised. A password stored 
in the human's memory is secure and cannot be unwillingly known to any other 
person. On the contrary, cryptographic keys are stored on the system which 
makes them prone to both internal and external attacks. Cryptographers increase 
the key size to make it difficult for an adversary to brute force a cryptographic 
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key [8]. Increasing the key entropy as a method of deterring key theft is 
impractical as there are numerous methods of capturing keys [6][9][10]. 
Cryptographic key theft in a group setting creates a unique environment 
where there are multiple attractive targets which an attacker can capture. Once 
a single system is compromised in a group then the attack can be escalated to 
capture the entire group. Owing to the existence of multiple points of attacks, 
group communications are at greater risk of being attacked. Similarly, when a 
single message is communicated in the group environment, it traverses through a 
large number of links which increases the possibility of the message being 
intercepted by an adversary. 
This research studies a comprehensive framework that provides security to 
devices communicating in a group setting. The aim of this research is to put into 
practice theories and concepts of the Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) 
technology in a multiparty environment. The research demonstrates that it is 
possible to use the features of a device to create an identification that provides 
security in the group setting. To achieve this the research investigates possible 
properties and features which can be used for the creation of an ICMetric of a 
device. The study aims to show evidence that the ICMetric technology can be 
used to generate cryptographic keys for the provision of authentication, 
confidentiality and integrity. The presented framework studies the ICMetric 
technology in two ways one: as a method of key theft deterrence and two: as a 
basis for cryptographic key generation. 
1.3 THESIS CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis investigates a set of topics to ensure security of devices 
communicating in a multiparty environment. The contributions of this thesis 
provide a means for enabling high levels of security in devices that perform 
communications and computations in a group environment. This thesis provides 
a secure framework which can be adapted to any environment where there are 
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devices that function collaboratively. Conventionally, cryptography has relied on 
stored keys for the provision of security. Stored keys are considered a vulnerability 
as they can be captured by an adversary. Hence by incorporating a key theft 
deterrent like the ICMetric technology provides a way of mitigating weaknesses 
that plague the field of cryptography. 
This thesis demonstrates that unique features of a device can be used to 
provide an identity to a devices which can then be used for the provision of 
security services. Hence, the first contribution of this thesis is that it explores 
unique explicit and implicit features which can be used to generate a device 
identity called the ICMetric. The ICMetric is a unique property which is why it 
cannot be communicated or stored on the system. This forms a challenge since a 
group ICMetric needs to be generated to identify devices communicating together 
in a group. 
The second contribution of this thesis is the provision of a scheme that 
assists in the generation of a group ICMetric while preserving the properties of 
the ICMetric. The research shows that the group ICMetric can be used for the 
creation of cryptographic keys for the group. 
The third contribution of this thesis is the creation of a symmetric key for 
the group by using the group ICMetric. The symmetric key generation algorithm 
relies on using the group ICMetric, well established security primitives and 
algorithms to create a symmetric key for the group. The scheme is also composed 
of an authentication method that facilitates ICMetric based authentication. 
The fourth contribution of this thesis is the creation of a scheme that uses 
the group ICMetric and RSA algorithm to generate asymmetric keys for the 
group. 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of this thesis is that it delivers high 
levels of security without having to make drastic changes to existing security 
systems. Thus the ICMetric technology can be integrated into any computation 
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system with minimum impact on existing infrastructure or technology. The 
ICMetric technology has been designed to integrate with conventional systems as 
it has been designed as a distinct add-on layer. 
1.4 SECURITY AIMS 
At the heart of a cryptosystem are goals around which development takes 
place. Each security goal must work in harmony with other security goals so that 
the resulting system is fully secure. Security goals are central to this research as 
system design choices are made based on the selected security goals. The security 
framework proposed in this research aims to fulfil three basic security goals i.e. 
authentication, confidentiality and integrity. Given below are the security goals 
of the project and how they can be interpreted with reference to the problem 
statement. 
• Authentication – provide systems with an identity and verify the 
correctness of the identity (machine authentication). 
o Access Control – limit access to only authenticated entities. Thus 
block unwanted or illegitimate access. 
• Confidentiality – ensure that communications are accessible to only 
authenticated entities. 
• Integrity – in this security goals the aim is to ensure the purity and 
trustworthiness of communications. Through integrity the system prevents 
unauthorized systems from making contributions and modifications to 
communications. Also prevent authorized participants from making 
dishonest contributions and modifications to communications. 
1.5 PHYSICAL ROOT OF TRUST 
Adversaries now have access to high power computing with sufficient 
resources to conduct a powerful attack. Therefore, researchers explore other 
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supporting methods which can enhance the security of conventional 
cryptography. Traditionally, cryptographic systems have relied on mathematical 
intractability [11] of primitives to guarantee security. Mathematical intractability 
is not sufficient to secure a system as often an adversary will not behave as 
expected. An adversary will often employ methods which do not exploit 
mathematical intractability like side channel and cold boot to attack a system. 
Therefore, a new breed of methods and primitives are required that are based on 
physical reasoning [12]. The use of physical reasoning to build a cryptographic 
system can ensure higher levels of security because the system primitives are 
rooted in the physical world. The physical root of trust in this research is the 
Integrated Circuit Metric technology. The ICMetric technology uses physical 
features of a device for the provision of cryptographic services. Figure 1.1 shows 
the physical world and its connection to the physical root of trust i.e. ICMetric 
technology. The physical root of trust is used to provide a basis for cryptographic 
primitives. The cryptographic primitives form building blocks for a set of security 
goals required for a secure multiparty environment. 
A concept similar to ICMetric is physically unclonable functions which are 
also used to provide hardware entangled security. A physically unclonable 
function uses a challenge-response system as a unique identifying feature. Hence 
a unique response to an input challenge is used to design systems based on the 
physically unclonable function. The ICMetric technology does not rely on a 
challenge-response system to create a device identification. Instead features are 
directly accessed and processed to provide security. What sets the ICMetric 
technology apart from physically unclonable functions is that the ICMetric 
technology uses multiple device features (rather than one) and processes them as 
a foundation for a range of services. The ICMetric technology can be used for 
providing security services like authentication, key generation, confidentiality etc. 
CHAPTER 1 
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Figure 1.1. Relationship between the physical world, root of trust and 
cryptography 
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
In response to the challenges faced by devices in group environment this 
thesis presents a comprehensive security framework that is based on the ICMetric 
technology. The contributions are arranged into chapters as follows: 
• Chapter 2 focuses on literature related to group environment and the 
security of devices in the group. The chapter begins with the description 
of a communication suite for devices in the Internet of Things. The suite 
is revisited so that it encompasses the ICMetric technology. The chapter 
also introduces security concerns that need to be addressed when securing 
devices in a group environment. 
• Chapter 3 introduces the ICMetric technology as a physical root of trust. 
The chapter explores the concept of a bias in a MEMS accelerometer, 
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gyroscope and strain gauge sensors. The chapter explores implicit and 
explicit features of a wearable health sensor for ICMetric generation. A 
detailed statistical study has also been presented for each MEMS sensor. 
The statistical study shows that each sensor possesses sufficient bias which 
can be used for ICMetric generation. After the creation of individual 
ICMetric the chapter provides a detailed account of how a group ICMetric 
can be generated using the ICMetric of individual devices. 
• In chapter 4 the creation of a symmetric key for groups of devices is 
explored. The chapter explores using Password Based Key Derivation 
Function to create a symmetric key for the group. This function is based 
on security primitives like salting, hashing and a large iteration count. The 
chapter explores these primitives and presents a novel algorithm that uses 
the group ICMetric to create a symmetric key for the multiparty 
environment. The chapter concludes with a performance analysis of the 
proposed symmetric key generation algorithm. 
• Chapter 5 focuses on the creation of an asymmetric key for the group 
environment. The proposed scheme uses the RSA algorithm with a group 
ICMetric to create an asymmetric key for the group. The chapter concludes 
with a performance analysis of the proposed asymmetric key generation 
algorithm. 
• Chapter 6 presents a security analysis of the proposed schemes in the 
standard model. Security proofs have been designed that test the proposed 
schemes by deliberately placing adversaries while various entities interact. 
The security proofs prove the security of the ICMetric technology, 
symmetric key generation, asymmetric key generation and prominent 
scheme primitives. 
• Chapter 7 closes the thesis with a conclusion and provides directions which 
can be explored for future research. 
  
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
As computing devices became ubiquitous the next logical step in the 
evolution of computers was to enable interconnectivity of devices for data and 
information sharing. The interconnectivity of devices is not a new concept, but it 
has come under renewed spotlight after the emergence of high capacity networks 
and small sized devices. Whenever devices share data and resources, it is 
important that both the communicating and the communicated are secure from 
attacks. This chapter presents a bird’s eye view of earlier works in the field of 
multiparty communications. A discussion on multiparty communications is 
incomplete without referring to the internet of things and the many devices that 
form part of the internet of things environment. Since internet of things is an 
emerging field of research therefore a survey of possible attacks on devices in the 
internet of things has been presented with focus on wearable technologies. This 
chapter highlights two recent security advancements i.e. physically unclonable 
functions and device fingerprinting. These two areas of secure computing form 
the basis of the ICMetric technology. The chapter explains the design principles 
of the ICMetric technology and how the features of a device can be used to form 
2.1 INTERNET OF THINGS 
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an identification of a device which is then used for the provision of cryptographic 
services. 
2.1 INTERNET OF THINGS 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of physical devices which collect 
and exchange data through the many form of network connectivity [13][14]. Thus 
the IoT is composed of multiple smart devices which can sense and communicate. 
The smart devices are intended to be worn on the body, carried by the owner, 
fitted on a wall or even installed ubiquitously. Hence the IoT presents a unique 
environment where devices with varying capability and resources are generating 
and sharing data. The emergence of IoT is a result of creating devices which are 
interoperable, thus they can share data and information. 
What sets IoT apart from regular computer networks is the fact that 
devices in the IoT ecosystem are sensors, devices, objects which are not considered 
computers. IoT devices are intended to be ubiquitous devices that function with 
minimum user intervention. Hence IoT devices are both consumers and producers 
of data. Broadly the IoT is the result of convergence of a number of technological 
trends as follows: 
• Ubiquitous computing – the creation of smart technology by embedding 
microprocessors in everyday objects so they can communicate and sense 
their surroundings. 
• Universal internet connectivity – the use of IP based networking to 
facilitate data and information sharing. 
• Miniaturization of technology – the reduction in size of computing 
technology owing to circuit miniaturization, microprocessors and 
embedded systems. 
• Cloud computing – the rise of cloud technology which enables resource 
sharing and also allows analytical feature aggregation via the cloud. 
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• Data analytics – algorithms and processes that facilitate the creation of 
knowledge from raw data obtained via the cloud. 
Based on a recent research [15] the IoT can be depicted as a multitier 
architecture with four layers namely perceptual layer, network layer, support 
layer and application layer. The perceptual layer is closest to the physical world 
while the top layers address issues related to data processing and information 
retrieval. The perceptual layer is composed of sensors and devices that interact 
with the physical world. The devices share data with the network layer so that 
data can be communicated across various networks. The abstraction layer 
supports the extraction of information from incoming datasets. The abstraction 
layer presents data to the application layer for customized information services. 
The application layer processes and presents the data provided by the abstraction 
layer. Figure 2.1 is the four layer communication suite for the IoT. 
 
Figure 2.1. A four layer IoT communication suite [15] 
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IoT is rapidly penetrating a wide range of domains for instance health 
monitoring, home automation, lifestyle, fitness monitoring, industrial support, 
entertainment, gaming etc. Below is a brief description of device categories in the 
IoT. 
• Health monitoring – wearable devices that measure physiological signals 
of its wearer. These devices can take body readings and also help with 
fitness monitoring. These devices measure heart rate, steps taken, distance 
covered and calories burnt during a physical exercise. 
• Smart Utilities and home automation – the devices in this category 
automate the home by providing remote appliance control, home intrusion 
detection and smart metering. 
• Industrial support – devices intended to be worn in an industrial 
environment. Devices in this category help with a large range of tasks like 
logistics, hazard monitoring, indoor asset location determination, process 
automation activities and ecommerce [16].  
• Entertainment – wearable devices that can stream audio and video. The 
devices in this category can be wireless headphones, speakers, and wearable 
displays with the ability of connecting to wide range of entertainment 
systems. Some devices are also used to create immersive environment 
during gameplay.  
• Lifestyle – general purpose wearable devices that provide internet, cellular 
and other forms of connectivity. These devices make it convenient for the 
user to carry out their everyday activities. It is these and many other 
devices which will integrate to form the smart cities [17]. 
Manufacturers of IoT devices are eager to capture an emerging market 
therefore the first devices to emerge were IoT capable versions of devices which 
we use every day. Research has been done on designing IoT capable wearable 
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technology. Internet capable watches, fitness trackers, fitness bands are just some 
of the few products which are a result of rapid research in the field of wearables 
in the IoT. Even though manufacturers have been successful in rapidly designing 
devices for the IoT. They have done so at the cost of lack of necessary services 
like security [18]. Wearable technologies make many promises but also possesses 
barriers [19] in their adoption. To unlock the full potential of IoT it is necessary 
that the devices possess both resources and the ability to provide security services. 
2.2 SECURITY CONCERNS 
Adversaries are often able to exploit weaknesses in a system to gain 
illegitimate access. As systems move out from the security of homes and offices 
to more ubiquitous settings, the importance of security cannot be denied. It is 
important to ensure the security of both hardware and software components of 
any system. Given below is a discussion on possible system attacks and their 
prevalence in everyday life. 
2.2.1 Physical Attacks 
A security concern with any hardware device is physical tampering. Since 
hardware devices process and store data therefore it is important to protect 
hardware from attacks which could lead to data being captured or modified. 
Conventionally, data processing is limited to the devices embedded system and 
external access is prohibited to defeat device tampering. Research [20] shows that 
tampering of a physical device can be carried out through probing, material 
removal techniques, contactless radiation imprinting, etc. These attacks exploit 
physical and chemical properties to gain illegitimate access to a system. 
Physical attacks [21] on systems can result in data theft, counterfeiting 
and cloning. Captured data is reassigned to a cloned device and then a verifier is 
convinced of the device legitimacy. A concern with cloned devices is that often 
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their use can go unnoticed. Cloning and counterfeiting can be defeated through 
strong encryption and by enforcing restricted access to decryption keys [22]. 
2.2.2 Attacks on Communications 
Communication based attacks allow an adversary to gain network access 
as a user or host, following which privileges are obtained leading to authentication 
and authorization abuse. Once access is obtained, an attacker may attempt to 
capture the cryptographic keys of the system. 
IP spoofing [23][24] is a common attack in networks where an attacker 
forges IP addresses thus leading to falsified IP packets. Done correctly, an 
attacker can capture, reroute, modify or delete data in the network. IP spoofing 
is particularly damaging because it is an online camouflage attack which is often 
difficult to detect. A recent attack in the USA called the Dyn Cyber Attack 
resulted in internet outages at an unprecedented scale [25]. Webservers of several 
high profile social media sites, news agencies etc. were compromised. The attack 
was carried out by using the Mirai malware [26]. It is estimated that to carry out 
the attack about 100,000 malicious IoT devices were used [27]. The malware 
functions by identifying vulnerable IoT devices that are using the factory default 
username and password. Once a device is captured it is then used as a bot to 
inundate a remote server with large amounts of data to create Distributed Denial 
of Service attack (DDoS) [28][29]. The amount of data was so large that many 
websites reported incoming data of upto 1 Tbps. 
Perhaps the most common form of attack on communication systems is 
eavesdropping. Many wearable devices transmit data wirelessly which makes 
them prone to eavesdropping. Eavesdropping can be defeated by ensuring that 
the data is encrypted when it leaves a system. 
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2.2.3 Attacks on Cryptosystems 
Cryptographic algorithms often base security on the secrecy of keys. 
Adversaries can attempt to compromise a system by capturing its cryptographic 
keys. What sets cryptographic key theft apart from other forms of attacks on 
computer systems is the fact that when keys are duplicated there may be no 
evidence of the unlawful activity [30]. When data is duplicated there is often no 
trace of the activity taking place. Similarly, when a cryptographic key is 
duplicated there is no evidence that the key was duplicated. Further, when a 
stolen cryptographic key is used in an unlawful way then its use often goes 
undetected. 
Research shows that cryptographic keys can be captured through a diverse 
range of attacks [9][10][31] like brute force, cold boot attacks, malware etc. As 
there are multiple methods of attack therefore key theft deterrence can be a 
complex task. Attackers attempt to exploit weaknesses or design flaws in a system 
to capture cryptographic keys. Given below are some possible attacks which can 
lead to key theft. 
• An attacker may attempt to defeat a cryptosystem by using brute force, 
dictionary based attacks, rainbow table attacks, man in the middle, etc. 
Appropriate steps like increasing key size, incorporating salts, not using 
obsolete algorithms can prevent these type of attacks. 
• An adversary may provide a malign key generation software (malware) so 
that the keys can be communicated to him. Detecting this attack is 
difficult because often the user is not aware of the presence of malware 
and because it may not be possible to identify a bad code in a program. 
There are other variants [32] of this attack which can have an adverse 
impact on a cryptosystem. 
• It is possible for attackers to use someone else’s public key and claim that 
it belongs to them. Certification authorities need evidence to show that 
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the key is not being used as a forged identity. Certification authorities 
have in the past mistakenly issued certificates to forgers owing to which 
there is a growing certificate revocation list in web browsers. 
• Cryptographic algorithms are often founded on algorithmic intractability 
like being based on large prime numbers, factorability etc. If the keys 
generation algorithm is weak or poorly designed then attacking the keys 
could be easier for an adversary. It is important that the keys are generated 
by a trusted authority. For example a key can be generated by an 
adversary impersonating as a trusted authority. Doing so the attacker 
would not only have knowledge of the keys but he may deliberately create 
bad keys which do not possess the correct properties. 
• Attackers may employ psychological manipulation, persuasion [33] to 
obtain the keys from their owners. It is vital that the keys are kept secret 
from both insiders and outsiders. Social engineering is a powerful tool and 
can be used to compromise security at various levels. 
By no means is this an exhaustive list of possible attacks on the keys of a 
cryptosystem. Readers should refer to [34][35] for a further discussion on possible 
attacks on cryptographic systems. 
2.2.4 Attack Statistics 
It has been seen that some devices in the IoT are being marketed with 
insufficient security provisions [7]. A reason for this is a lack of understanding of 
why an attacker would attack a device in the first place. It is a known fact that 
data and information is a commodity in the underground economy [18]. Attackers 
will go to any lengths to capture data so that it can be sold to prospective buyers. 
The effects of attacks on the various types of computation systems have been 
widely recognized and published [36][37]. According to a report [38] 100 million 
healthcare records were stolen or compromised in 2015. The report demonstrates 
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that these health records contain a wealth of information like credit card data, 
email addresses, social security numbers and employment details just to name a 
few. This data is captured to commit fraud by stealing medical identities. An 
attack analysis shows that 15.5% of attacks were carried out by inadvertent 
actors. These insiders were either duped or lured into performing actions which 
can result in a security breach. Often an employee or subcontractor will give away 
information due to either incompetence or ill will.  Given in figure 2.2 is a pie 
chart showing the breakdown of attacks on healthcare systems. 
 
Figure 2.2. A breakdown of attacks on healthcare systems in 2015 [38] 
Unauthorized access dominated the list of incident categories [38] with 45% 
while malicious code came second with 29%. Other forms of attacks have been 
identified but these attacks had significantly lower impact. From the incident 
categories it can be concluded that attackers attempt to capture valuable data 
remotely by exploiting weaknesses in the system. 
2.3 ATTACKS ON WEARABLE TECHNOLOGY 
In [39] the author has studied the wearable technology industry both 
technically and statistically. The author concludes that wearable technologies 
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have three limitations which are barriers to their wide adoption i.e. battery life, 
chipset limitations, design concerns. Owing to these limitations wearable devices 
face many challenges among which data security and privacy is an important one. 
IoT devices are finding their way into many different fields one of which 
is healthcare. Research [40] shows that the IoT will transform the way the 
healthcare industry works. In [41] the authors present a study on how wearable 
devices can improve working of challenging environments like hospital wards. 
They present a case study in which they conclude that wearable devices would 
enhance the level of usability and context awareness. The authors have identified 
four security challenges facing wearable devices i.e. confidentiality, 
authentication, hostile environment and device network security. 
Wearable devices incorporate practical features and function by using the 
latest technologies and trends. Wearable devices are being used and experimented 
with to facilitate the wearer through various ways [42]. A recent research [43] on 
fall detection through inertial sensing has been studied by Kumar et al. The 
authors design an assisted living wearable device embedded with a tri-axial 
accelerometer and tri-axial gyroscope. By using these two sensors the wearable 
device can sense linear acceleration and angular velocity to detect falls in the 
elderly or disabled. The wearable device facilitates communication of data by 
using Bluetooth. Being a health monitoring sensor the system continuously senses 
motion related variables, but the system lacks any form of security 
implementation. 
There are multiple ways of authenticating the wearer of a device one of 
which is through gait recognition. Authenticating wearable devices using gait 
recognition is a concept which has been explored [44] [45] in much detail. Chauhan 
et al. in their paper [46] design a security scheme for the optical wearable device 
Google Glass. The authors present an unobtrusive security scheme which uses 
multiple user gestures to establish user authenticity. Although the concept is 
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interesting it has a weakness that it requires user intervention for authenticity. 
Another weakness of the proposed scheme is that the user must possess prior 
experience with the Google Glass for improved accuracy. 
Authentication can also be carried out by sensing bioelectrical body 
signals. Researchers have developed a scheme [47] which can detect the wearer of 
a wearable device by using the bioelectrical impedance signal. The research shows 
that it is possible to use a wrist wearable health sensor called the Shimmer sensor 
[48] to uniquely identify a user by using their physiological signals. The proposed 
scheme possesses a 98% successful authentication rate but the scheme does not 
offer other basic security services like integrity and confidentiality. The provision 
of authenticity alone is a false promise of security and hence the work needs 
extension. 
A recent research [49] shows that even widely marketed wearable devices 
can possess poor security provisions which makes attacking them an effortless 
task. The paper studies the Fitbit tracker that has 96KB RAM and is embedded 
with an accelerometer sensor, altimeter sensor. The paper studies the security of 
the Fitbit tracker and shows that it is possible to attack the wearable device by 
exploiting weaknesses in the system. The authors reverse engineer the Fitbit and 
observe that it lacks security provisions. For instance the tracker transmits user 
credentials in plain text. Besides this any HTTP data processing that takes place 
is also in plaintext. The authors also demonstrate that counterfeit data can be 
generated and injected into the tracker by attaching it to moving objects like the 
wheel of a car. 
Devices in the IoT are not just limited to wearables. Devices of many forms 
are available which can be installed in various settings and accessed remotely. In 
[7] the author demonstrates practically how to attack various systems in the IoT. 
The author demonstrates how to attack common IoT enabled systems like home 
lighting, electronic door locks, baby monitors, smart televisions, and smart 
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vehicles. The study on various IoT enabled systems shows that security 
weaknesses are not just limited to low priced systems. The author has taken a 
416 horse power Tesla S P85+ electric car and demonstrates how it can be stolen 
through multiple methods of attack like password theft, API adaptation and 
network based exploits. Similarly, the author demonstrates that often weaknesses 
are found in systems because of poor design. For instance a Samsung Smart 
television allows users to upgrade its firmware. Studying [7] the firmware shows 
that the firmware is encrypted using a flawed implementation of XOR cipher [50]. 
In the implementation a key much smaller than the plaintext is used which means 
that a large portion of the plaintext is never encrypted. Weaknesses in IoT 
capable devices shows that multiparty systems need to be redesigned for improved 
security, privacy and safety. 
2.4 PHYSICALLY UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS 
It is a known fact that no two silicon chips are created alike [51]. Even if 
the manufacturing, design, materials are the same the resulting chips vary from 
each other considerably. A reason for this variability in the chips is uncontrollable 
and unavoidable variation at the molecular level. These variations are employed 
for creating a one way function called Physically Unclonable Functions (PUF). A 
PUF is a function based on a physical property and holds the quality that it is 
unclonable [52]. When a PUF is queried with a challenge 𝑥 the function provides 
a secret response 𝑦 such that the response is based on the unique characteristics 
of a device. Hence a PUF produces an unpredictable output which is based on 
the underlying physical properties of the device. A PUF exploits the variability 
in chip manufacturing to create an unpredictable output that is characteristic of 
the particular device [53]. Figure 2.3 gives a generic depiction of a PUF. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
22 
 
 
Figure 2.3. A generic PUF with the challenge 𝑥 and associated response 𝑦 
PUF’s possess qualities like robustness, unclonability, unpredictability and 
tamper evident design which makes them an attractive technology for use in 
cryptography. Given below is a description of PUF qualities in a security system: 
• Robustness – when queried with a single challenge, the PUF must produce 
similar responses with a high probability. 
• Unclonability – it should be infeasible for an adversary to produce two 
PUF’s that produce a single response to a single challenge. 
• Unpredictability – it should be infeasible for an adversary to predict the 
response to a challenge even if the adversary has previously queried the 
system multiple times. 
• Tamper evident – if an adversary attempts to tamper with a PUF then 
this should change the challenge-response behaviour. 
Owing to their unique properties and design, PUF’s have become very 
attractive for use in a variety of security related applications [54][55]. The security 
of cryptographic schemes is based on mathematical problems that are now under 
attack due to the creation of new computing architectures and algorithms. 
Research studies [56][57][58] have shown that PUF’s can be used for hardware 
entangled cryptography, authentication, IC-identification, anti-counterfeiting, 
and random number generation. Since a PUF is an unmodifiable function 
therefore it can be used to prevent overclocking and also detect whether the 
binding between hardware and software is in conformance with a manufacturers 
recommendations [59]. The use of a PUF for key generation offers the greatest 
flexibility because a PUF is non-volatile yet at the same time it does not have 
PUF Challenge (𝑥) Response (𝑦) 
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the problems associated with data storage and data theft. Thus PUF’s can provide 
intrinsic key storage that is hardware associated [60]. 
Research is underway to identify unique characteristics that can be used 
for creating strong PUF’s. Early research [61] showed that optical PUF’s can be 
created by detecting the splatter pattern from a stationary scattering medium 
placed in the path of a laser. In this application the input is the placement of the 
laser beam in the x-y plane while output is the associated splatter pattern. This 
research practically demonstrated the establishment of PUF but had limited 
useful applications. Research [62] has shown that it is possible to use RFID as a 
PUF. The authors demonstrate that a 64 bit input challenge can be used to create 
a unique response. The PUF is designed with a scrambling circuit to help prevent 
learning based attacks on the PUF output. Experiments on manufacturing 
variability in logic gates shows that a delay in the circuit gates can be used as a 
PUF [57]. The authors have observed that logic gates are influenced by factors 
like supply voltage and operational temperature. These parameters are prone to 
change which is why the PUF is classed as weak. Experiments [63][64] on using 
Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) cells as a PUF have shown that each 
cell has a start-up state of either zero or one. This state is unpredictable which 
makes it very suitable for generating a unique device fingerprint also known as 
SRAM PUF [65]. 
The use of PUF has been studied in cryptography. Research shows that a 
PUF can be used for authentication [66], secure key storage [67], key generation, 
key zeroization [68] etc. It is recognized that using PUF to support cryptographic 
functionalities can provide increased flexibility, security, reliability while reducing 
cost and storage needs [67]. Researchers [69] have studied the design and 
implementation of a PUF based cryptographic key generator. The key generator 
uses a modular design that is based on a ring oscillator. Tests on the PUF have 
shown that it has 99% entropy coupled with a low overhead. The authors have 
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shown that the designed tool is highly adaptable but they have not shown 
technically if the PUF can be trusted as a basis for a cryptographic key. The 
authors conclude their work stating that it is information-theoretically security. 
The viability of PUF is recognised in computationally advanced devices 
owing to the availability of a wide range of measurable features. Research [70] 
has shown that PUF’s can be used in low end embedded devices for eliminating 
anti-counterfeiting and software manipulation. The research aims to secure 
devices that are commonly available, lack resources and are low priced. The 
research uses an SRAM PUF for creating a secret with full entropy. The authors 
have shown that their software implementation uses hash functions and on 
average these will add a 63% overhead to the existing software. This is relatively 
high considering the fact that many of the devices may lack sufficient resources. 
A positive point of the work is that the performance overhead is not too excessive 
at 10%. 
2.5 IDENTIFICATION THROUGH FINGERPRINTING 
Biometric fingerprinting [71][72] is the process of identifying individuals by 
using their fingerprints. Biometric fingerprints uniquely identify an individual 
because of unique placement of lines and ridges on the fingers. 
Device fingerprinting follows a similar concept by generating an 
identification for a device using features that help distinguish it from other 
devices. Motivation for device fingerprints stems from the broad-spectrum 
importance of biometric fingerprinting. A recent yet broad definition of a device 
fingerprint has been given in RFC 6973 [73]. The RFC offers guidance on privacy 
consideration for internet protocols and defines a fingerprint as follows: 
Definition 2.1. The fingerprint of a device is defined as a set of information 
elements that identify a device or application instance [73]. 
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Although the definition is fairly broad it can be concluded that the purpose 
of a fingerprint is to identify a device (with a sufficiently high probability). Thus 
to identify a device the choice of identification elements plays an important role 
and should not be limited to only the hardware environment. All computation 
devices possess subtle but measurable variations which can be obtained to create 
fingerprints. Commonly referred to as device fingerprints or hardware fingerprint, 
the purpose of these fingerprints is to identify an individual device, system or a 
user with a high precision. There are many methods of uniquely identifying a 
device. A common method of device identification in a web based environment is 
achieved through the use of HTTP cookies [74]. When used constructively, a 
cookie allows a web server to store small piece of information on a client system. 
This file is then sent back to the server when subsequent connections are 
established. The purpose of cookies is to track the user activities and browsing 
habits to customize browsing sessions. Destructive use of cookies can undermine 
user privacy and allow attackers to tailor exploits according to the installed 
browser, plugins, applications and operating system [75]. 
Seminal work on web browser fingerprinting [76] shows that fingerprints 
can be created using configurations found in a browser. The author demonstrates 
that a fingerprint can be created using unique browser features like fonts, screen 
resolution, timezone, browser plugins, canvas, WebGL, etc. to identify a browser 
with fairly high precision. When a user switches browsers the fingerprint also 
changes, which may seem like a limitation but one must acknowledge that most 
users tend to have a single favourite browser therefore the browser fingerprint 
can be used as a device fingerprint. The outcomes of the research have design 
implication both for privacy and technical design. 
A recent research [77] demonstrated that it is possible to fingerprint mobile 
devices using personalized configurations found in the device. The authors have 
identified 29 unique features which can identify a device with 97% accuracy. The 
authors use a unique set of features like WiFi SSID, device model, device name, 
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network carrier name, twitter account name, songs list, etc. to create a device 
fingerprint. 
A simple amalgamation of device features does not guarantee a useful 
fingerprint. To be effective, machine fingerprints must possess two qualities i.e. 
diversity and stability. These two qualities form guidelines for the formation of a 
fingerprint that is exclusive and inimitable. The diversity of a fingerprint can be 
studied by measuring its entropy. While stability of a fingerprint can be verified 
through rigorous device testing to prove resilience to change. Given below is a 
definition of diversity and stability. 
Definition 2.2. The diversity of a machine fingerprint is the quality that no two 
devices have the same fingerprint. The more features used for creating a device 
fingerprint, the more likely it is to obtain a distinguishing fingerprint. 
Definition 2.3. The stability of a machine fingerprint is the quality that the 
fingerprint remains constant over time. The more features used for creating a 
device fingerprint, the less likely it is for the fingerprint to remain stable. 
Capability, complexity and resources of the target system dictates whether 
the features of a device will simply be collected or extracted through an intricate 
methodology. Given below is a breakdown of feature extraction and classification 
methods. 
2.5.1 Client/ Server Models for Feature Extraction 
Conventional device fingerprinting techniques are mostly web based and 
follow one of two models either client based or server based [78]. When using the 
client based method; the device features are extracted by installing software on 
the client device. The problem with the client based method is that installing the 
software requires user permission which may not always be possible since many 
users and organizations prohibit software installations. Installing the software is 
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prone with its own dangers since the software may be a malware concealed in a 
seemingly meaningful application. 
The server based method does not require a software installation because 
device identifications are generated by gathering device characteristics that are 
readily available and may not require user permission. The problem with this 
technique is that the device identifications are assembled using relatively simpler 
features which do not ensure diversity and entropy. Features used in the server 
method can be extracted and reproduced by attackers thus aiding spoofing. An 
example of server based device identification is the use of browser cookies which 
use stored information and credentials to identify users and sessions [79]. 
2.5.2 Intrusive Feature Extraction 
Based on the level of intrusiveness, there are two methods [80][81] of 
feature extraction i.e. active fingerprinting and passive fingerprinting. Active 
fingerprinting actively queries the system for information required for establishing 
the fingerprint. In active fingerprinting the stimulus may be applied as an 
intrusive method of querying the system. 
Passive fingerprinting establishes device features through less intrusive 
methods like monitoring a communication link. Most communication based 
fingerprinting methods are passive in nature and establish a device fingerprint by 
using network and packet information [82][83]. 
Passive and active fingerprinting offer benefits in different areas of 
application. Active fingerprinting offers more accuracy [81] as it has the ability 
to examine a wider range of behaviours which cannot be obtained using passive 
methods of fingerprinting. 
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2.5.3 Feature Classification Methodologies 
Traditionally, device fingerprints are generated using features such as 
MAC addresses, serial numbers, OS fingerprint, cookies etc. The complexity of 
the selected features influences the unpredictability of the generated device 
fingerprint. Recent research [84][85] explores for the purpose of identification 
implicit features and proves that it is possible to identify a device using internal 
features. Broadly device features are placed into two categories i.e. explicit and 
implicit. 
Explicit – those fingerprints which are established using well-defined and 
standardised features outlined by the manufacturer. These features can include 
serial numbers, MAC addresses, firmware versions and clock frequencies. These 
features are simpler to extract owing to which they can be easily predicted and 
spoofed. A challenge with these features is that they often appear on the exterior 
of the device (MAC address, IMEI, serials etc.) which makes compromising the 
resulting fingerprint an effortless task. Even if these features do not appear on 
the exterior of a device they can be extracted using a combination of network 
monitoring and analysis tools. 
Implicit – those fingerprints which are established using less obvious features. 
These features may be a result of inconsistencies in the device fabrication 
processes. For example the clock skew varies in every device even though the 
clock frequency remains the same for a particular device and model. Implicit 
features are unique and low level features which are not easy to predict thus 
making spoofing a difficult task. 
2.6 INTEGRATED CIRCUIT METRIC 
According to the Kerckhoff’s [86] principle, “the security of a system should 
lie in keeping the key secret and not the algorithm”. Whenever a cryptographic 
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algorithm is designed it is widely published so that it can be studied for 
conformance to the highest levels of security. If the algorithm is published then 
the only crucial element keeping the system secure is the cryptographic key. A 
cryptographic key is selected from a key space such that the key space is large 
enough to prevent brute force attacks while every key has the same possibility of 
being selected. Ensuring that the keys are generated at random simply certifies 
that the keys are unique but does not defeat the possibility of key theft. Also an 
increase in the key entropy makes it difficult for adversaries to brute force but 
does not eliminate the possibility of key theft. This implies that a stored 
cryptographic key is an Achilles heel in conventional security systems. 
Traditionally, attackers will breach a system and attempt to capture the secret 
key. Once the key is captured then decryption and other cryptographic operations 
are trivial tasks which can be carried out without much effort. Besides this 
attackers can attempt to gain illegitimate access to data and network through a 
wide range of attacks as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
Two methods of ensuring device security have been identified in the 
literature [87]. The first method of security attempts to authenticate the user 
wearing the device while the second method aims to identify the device and thus 
secure it. These are two different paradigms where the first ensures only the 
security of the wearer. The second method secures the device which leads to the 
security of its wearer. As cryptographic keys are stored on a device therefore 
focusing on just the device or the user can result in a flawed security 
implementation. 
The Integrated Circuit Metric (ICMetric) technology [88][89] has been 
conceived as an alternative method to stored keys and as a basis for a range of 
cryptographic services. The unique concept and design of the ICMetric technology 
does not limited its use as an alternative method to stored keys. Research [88][89] 
on the ICMetric technology shows that it is both possible and recommended to 
use the features of a device to generate an ICMetric which can then be used for 
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the provision of cryptographic services in a system. The ICMetric technology 
deters key theft by entirely eliminating the need for stored cryptographic keys. 
By using the ICMetric technology there is no need to store the keys or any 
associated templates because the ICMetric and keys are generated when required 
and discarded thereafter. Doing so discourages attackers since there is no 
cryptographic key present on the system. The ICMetric technology bears close 
resemblance to biometric systems, as these systems use identifiable features to 
identify different persons. Similarly the ICMetric technology proposes using 
device features to identify every device uniquely. The ICMetric technology 
achieves this without the need for stored templates or associated data. This 
quality means that the ICMetric technology can be used for preventing key theft, 
impersonation and spoofing based attacks on computation systems. 
The ICMetric technology processes unique measurable properties and 
features from a device and provides as output an identification formally called 
the ICMetric. The creation of an ICMetric is a complex process primarily because 
the ICMetric is based on both explicit and implicit features. The security of an 
ICMetric based system relies heavily on the features employed for ICMetric 
generation. For instance even though the MAC address uniquely identifies a 
device, it is not a strong candidate because it can be easily extracted using a 
network surveillance tool like Wireshark. Owing to this, the ICMetric is generated 
using a range of low level features of a device. Using low level features has the 
advantage that these features cannot be easily predicted or replicated by an 
adversary. Previous studies [90][91][92] have identified hardware features which 
can be used for ICMetric generation. Experiments show that the Program 
Counter (PC) and Cycles Per Instructions (CPI) can used to generate an 
ICMetric. The use of these features for ICMetric generation has not been 
investigated on smart devices. 
As the ICMetric is a form of device fingerprint that will enable various 
security applications therefore it must possess certain qualities as follows: 
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• Unique – the ICMetric of a device must be unique. 
• Reproducible – the ICMetric of a device must be a reproducible i.e. the 
same ICMetric must be generated every time it is required. 
• Deterministic – the features used to generate an ICMetric must have a 
deterministic range. This ensures that the features produce consistent 
readings resulting in a stable and reproducible ICMetric. 
• Self-producing – a device should generate an ICMetric without the need 
for special instrumentation or user intervention. 
• Non-disruptive – the ICMetric should be generated without disrupting the 
regular functioning of a device. 
• Non communicability – to protect from attacks the ICMetric cannot be 
communicated even to trusted entities. 
Not all feature of a device are suitable for creating an ICMetric. The 
features should possess certain qualities that make them suitable for the purpose. 
A multivalued feature must possess the following qualities to qualify as a 
candidate for ICMetric generation. 
• Feature values can map onto a unimodal distribution i.e. feature values 
must not be erratic in nature. 
• Features can possess a Gaussian distribution. 
Multimodal distributions possess two or more pronounced peaks in 
response to a single stimulus. Multimodal distributions present much greater 
challenges owing to overlapping observations which often implies that a data 
sample lacks homogeneity. Processing this dataset requires complex algorithms 
[88] which can reduce the practicality of an ICMetric based system. 
As the ICMetric of a device is unique, one may be tempted to use the 
ICMetric as a cryptographic key. The ICMetric of a device cannot be used as a 
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cryptographic key because it lacks size and entropy making it susceptible to 
attack [93]. The ICMetric technology is designed as an extra security layer that 
aims to change how cryptography has been implemented in computation devices. 
The purpose of designing the ICMetric technology as a layer is to provide seamless 
connectivity to the existing security infrastructure, technologies and algorithms. 
Thus the ICMetric technology aims to enhance security with minimum impact 
on existing system operations. An extended ICMetric based IoT communication 
suite is given in figure 2.4. The ICMetric layer connects with the perceptual layer 
so that device features can be obtained from physical world. The ICMetric layer 
enables feature extraction, ICMetric generation and ICMetric security. 
 
Figure 2.4. IoT communication suite with an ICMetric layer 
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2.6.1 ICMetric Generation 
Generation of an ICMetric begins once the features of a device have been 
extracted. Individual device features are extracted and then feature sets are 
established to process statistically. The ICMetric generation is a two-step process 
composed of a calibration phase and an operational phase. These phases are 
applied only when required following which the ICMetric and any associated data 
are discarded. The ICMetric and associated feature data is never communicated 
during any phase of generation or use. 
Step 1 - Calibration Phase 
• Suitable features are selected to obtain readings for a device. The 
individual readings are used to define feature sets to be used for frequency 
analysis. 
• Compute frequency distributions for each feature set. 
• Create histograms using the frequency distribution. 
• Compute statistical credentials from individual histograms. 
• Combine credentials to generate device ICMetric. 
Step 2 - Operation Phase 
• Extract feature values required for ICMetric generation. 
• Generate the histograms by first computing the frequency distributions for 
the feature sets. 
• Apply cryptographic key generation scheme for the provision of security 
services. 
2.6.2 Combining Features 
Individual feature values/ credentials need to be combined so that a final 
ICMetric can be computed. Two techniques have been identified [94][95] which 
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can be used for combining feature values i.e. feature addition and feature 
concatenation. 
2.6.2.1 Feature Combination through Addition 
In feature combination through addition the ICMetric is generated 
by adding the individual feature values. A benefit of this technique is that 
the resulting ICMetric is highly diverse because adding a feature introduces 
variance but has low impact on the size of the number. If 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 is the 
ICMetric of a device and 𝐹 is a feature then the ICMetric using 𝑛 
individual features can be represented as follows: 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 =  ∑ 𝐹𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (1) 
2.6.2.2 Feature Combination through Concatenation 
An alternative to the feature addition technique is the feature 
concatenation technique. In this technique the individual feature values 
are combined using the concatenation operation. The resulting ICMetric 
lacks diversity but has a longer length [94] as incorporation of each feature 
increases the overall length. If ∥ is the concatenation operation then the 
device ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 using 𝑛 individual features can be represented as: 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 =  𝐹1 ∥ 𝐹2 ∥ ⋯ ∥ 𝐹𝑛 (2) 
2.6.3 Comparing ICMetric and PUF 
The ICMetric technology and PUF share a similar concept but in 
reality they are different. The ICMetric technology uses measurable 
hardware and software features for creating a device identification. The 
2.7 SUMMARY 
35 
 
ICMetric technology does not always rely on a challenge and its associated 
response. This implies that the ICMetric technology can be used to find 
correlations between various system elements which may not even take a 
challenge as an input. Further, the ICMetric technology extracts features 
and then processes them to produce a single device identity. As the 
ICMetric of a device can be used to generate keys therefore it can be said 
that the technology is a key theft deterrent and also provides authenticated 
communications using asymmetric keys (private key encryption coupled 
with public key decryption). 
Commonly PUF’s are hardware oriented and use a challenge-
response setup to establish legitimacy. The challenge-response naturally 
places a limit on the number of features which can be used as suitable 
PUF’s for securing computation systems. This limit comes from the fact 
that not all system elements are designed for querying. An example of this 
is single line identification chips [96]. Compared to an ICMetric multiple 
responses from individual PUF’s are combined using an XOR arbiter PUF 
[97]. Another factor that is worth mentioning here is that if a PUF is based 
on an analogue system then it is highly susceptible to noise. 
2.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter has established the importance of security in the group 
environment. The chapter takes the example of the emerging IoT as a collection 
of smart objects. As the IoT is composed of multiple interconnected devices that 
function ubiquitously in a heterogeneous environment therefore special emphasis 
has been placed on the security of wearable devices. To highlight the problem 
associated with security of groups it has been proven that when devices 
communicate in a group environment they can be an easy target for adversaries. 
CHAPTER 2 
36 
 
Convenient access to computation power means that adversaries are stronger 
than before and they can attack devices through multiple methods. This chapter 
demonstrates with the help of research studies that some devices in the IoT 
possess insufficient security provision. It has also been shown with examples that 
those devices which offer security, possess flaws which can be exploited by 
adversaries. There are numerous ways through which a system can be attacked, 
therefore this chapter establishes that adversaries will attempt to exploit physical, 
communication or cryptosystem weaknesses to gain illegitimate access. Often the 
goal of adversaries is to attack a system so that the cryptographic keys can be 
captured. Effort to increase the key entropy is not a practical approach since 
attackers can capture the key by exploiting network or physical weaknesses in 
the system. 
This chapter explores device fingerprints and physically unclonable 
functions as a prequel to hardware entangled cryptography. The chapter then 
presents an in-depth study on the novel ICMetric technology. The ICMetric 
technology has been studied as a key theft deterrent technology and as a basis 
for a range of cryptographic services. The technology proposes using unique 
features of a device to create an identification called an ICMetric. The ICMetric 
technology processes unique reproducible explicit and implicit features so that the 
resulting ICMetric is truly unique. The two phases of ICMetric generation have 
also been presented for processing a range of possible features which are explored 
in the upcoming chapter.
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ICMETRIC - A FEATURE STUDY 
 
 
Recently, there has been much interest in the area of device fingerprinting. 
The area of research is in its experimental incarnation, and its attraction stems 
from many sources. Among these is the hope that machine fingerprinting will 
provide a much needed identification to the many devices on the internet. 
Additionally there are many benefits for telecommunications, cryptography and 
forensic sciences. 
A difficulty associated with device fingerprinting complimented 
cryptography is the lack of formally specified algorithms, models and protocols 
that guarantee high levels of security. There are numerous features in a device 
which can be used for identification, but these features lack complexity which is 
why they are likely to be captured by adversaries. 
The ICMetric technology is not just a device fingerprinting technology. 
The purpose of this novel technology is to create a unique device identification 
which can be used for a wide range of cryptographic services like authentication, 
key generation, confidentiality and integrity. Hence by using the ICMetric 
technology a device identification is created which is used for the provision of 
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cryptographic services. The security of an ICMetric based system relies on finding 
features suitable for generating a device ICMetric. If this is done incorrectly the 
resulting system gives a false guarantee of security. This chapter presents a study 
on unique explicit and implicit features which can be used to generate a device 
ICMetric. Many modern devices utilize embedded MEMS sensor for the provision 
of a wide range of services. MEMS sensors like the accelerometer, gyroscope and 
strain gauge possess a bias which is noticeable in the readings obtained from the 
sensor. This chapter presents a study on the bias found in MEMS sensors and 
shows that the bias can be used for ICMetric generation. 
The ICMetric of individual devices can be used to create a group identity. 
This identity called the group ICMetric is generated using the Shamir secret 
sharing scheme. This chapter also demonstrates how the group ICMetric is 
generated while preserving ICMetric secrecy of the individual devices. 
3.1 MICRO ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL SYSTEMS 
Micro Electrical Mechanical Systems (MEMS) is the name given to 
miniaturization of sensors that are designed using a combination of mechanical 
and electrical components [98]. The physical size of a MEMS component can 
range from less than one micron to several millimetres. What sets the MEMS 
based sensors apart from other sensors is the fact that they use a combination of 
electrical and mechanical components to sense physical characteristics. The 
sensors sense and convert mechanical, thermal, magnetic, optical, chemical 
phenomena into digital readings by using specialized electrical components. A 
typical MEMS system is composed of four components i.e. Micro sensors, micro 
actuators, microelectronics and micro structures. 
The accelerometer and the gyroscope are the most widely used MEMS 
sensors and have a wide range of applications [99]. These sensors are being 
embedded into smartphones, laptops and vehicles. In smartphones the 
accelerometer and gyroscope are used to enable motion recognition [100]. 
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Smartphones use accelerometer and the gyroscope as a source of additional 
information to enable rotation and tilt detection. In laptops the accelerometer 
and gyroscope is used to sense freefall/ movement so that the hard drive head 
can be paused thus preventing damage to the head or the surface of the disk. In 
vehicles the accelerometer is used to activate air bags by detecting a spike in 
acceleration which is an indicator of a collision. A gyroscope is embedded in 
vehicles to enable electronic stability control features so that roll overs can be 
prevented [101]. 
This chapter studies the possibility of generating an ICMetric by using low 
level features from MEMS sensors. Experiments on unique features for the 
generation of an ICMetric is based on a wearable health device called the Shimmer 
sensor [48]. The sensor is a rechargeable battery powered device embedded with 
an accelerometer, gyroscope, strain gauge, ECG and EMG sensor. The sensor has 
a sampling frequency from 5Hz to 50Hz and data is communicated via Bluetooth. 
The Shimmer sensor is supplied with two straps so that it can be worn either on 
a wrist or around the waist. Before delving into the experimental details it is 
important to first understand the internal working of the MEMS accelerometer, 
gyroscope and strain gauge sensors. 
3.1.1 MEMS Accelerometer 
The accelerometer [102] is a capacitance based displacement sensor which 
is composed of fixed plates placed in a spring mounted movable mass. Capacitive 
sensors sense physical input by a change in capacitance. The change in 
capacitance is so miniscule that it can only be read using specialized electronics. 
The sensor is composed of plates that are suspended in a movable mass. A voltage 
is applied across the plates so that a change in capacitance can be measured when 
the sensor is subjected to an external force. Figure 3.1 shows that a voltage has 
been applied to the plates suspended in the movable mass. When an acceleration 
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is applied the movable mass moves which in turn causes a change in capacitance 
between the suspended plates and the movable mass. 
 
Figure 3.1. The working principle of a MEMS accelerometer (a) no acceleration 
results in the same capacitance on the fixed plates (b) acceleration causes 
change in capacitance between the fixed plates 
Suppose a voltage 𝑉 is applied to the fixed plates in the sensor. This 
voltage produces a capacitances 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 between the fixed plates and the 
movable mass. If the device is stationary or moving at a constant velocity then 
the two capacitances will be equal hence: 
𝐶1 = 𝐶2 (3) 
If the device experiences a change in velocity then both capacitances 𝐶1 and 𝐶2 
will be different thus: 
𝐶1 ≠ 𝐶2 (4) 
If a MEMS accelerometer possesses an imperfection it is reflected in the 
readings obtained from the sensor. Hence if an acceleration is applied to a sensors 
axes, then the sensed acceleration readings will differ from those being applied. 
The readings from a modern accelerometer represent the acceleration (m/sec2) 
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along the three axes of motion. The Shimmer sensor follows this conventions and 
provides tri-axial accelerometer readings in a CSV file. 
3.1.2 MEMS Gyroscope 
The MEMS gyroscope is a sensor based on the Coriolis effect [103]. This 
effect is experienced by a body when it is subjected to velocity in a rotating frame 
of reference. Gyroscopes sense angular velocity with the help of drive arms that 
twist and rotate when they sense rotation. The drive arms are designed to be tall 
structures that resonate according to the sensed rotation. When a drive arm 
experiences axial rotation or lateral movement the drive arm is subjected to a 
Coriolis force and Coriolis acceleration. A gyroscope is designed so that the 
Coriolis force on the drive arm is proportional to the rotation speed in the 
particular frame of reference. Hence a gyroscope always measures the effect of a 
force experienced by the drive arm. Figure 3.2 shows the construction of a MEMS 
gyroscope and how the drive arm behaves when it experiences axial rotation and 
lateral movement. 
 
Figure 3.2. The working principle of a MEMS Gyroscope (a) drive arm 
movement with rotation (b) drive arm movement with lateral movement 
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Readings from a MEMS gyroscope can be used to detect the presence of a 
bias [104]. If a MEMS gyroscope possesses an imperfection it is reflected in the 
readings obtained from the sensor. Hence, if a rotation is applied to a sensor, then 
the sensed rotation readings will differ from those applied. The readings from a 
modern gyroscope represent the rotation (deg/sec) along the three axes of motion. 
The Shimmer sensor follows this conventions and provides tri-axial gyroscope 
readings in a CSV file. 
3.1.3 MEMS Strain Gauge 
The strain gauge is a unique sensor which is integrated to detect 
mechanical stresses and strains on a system. The sensor is commonly integrated 
into devices to enable decision support where mechanical stresses and strains are 
encountered. The strain gauge can be found in a variety of systems targeting 
health monitoring systems, to automotive, aerospace, wind turbine and other 
similar mechatronic systems [105]. 
The strain gauge sensor uses the relation between material properties and 
electrical conductance to measure the strain sensed by the sensor. If a conductive 
metal strip is stretched it will result in an increased end to end resistance. 
Conversely, if the metal strip is compressed it will result in a reduced end to end 
resistance. The stretching and compression must be reasonable so that the 
internal conductor does not permanently buckle or compress thus damaging the 
sensor altogether. 
A typical MEMS strain gauge uses a thin metal foil in a strain sensitive 
pattern. When a strain is experienced by the sensor it will result in a change in 
the resistance thus exhibiting a change in the voltage. Figure 3.3 shows the 
construction of a MEMS strain gauge sensor. 
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Figure 3.3. The working principle of a MEMS strain gauge sensor (a) a sensor 
without stresses applied (b) stretching causes an increase in resistance (c) 
compression causes a decrease in resistance 
Although the strain gauge sensor is used to detect mechanical stresses and 
strains, it can also be used in situations where a device has been attacked 
physically. If a hardware component embedded with a strain gauge sensor is 
attacked physically then the sensor can detect differences in the original and the 
residual stresses on the system. To detect if a sensor has been physically attacked 
a threshold must be defined to determine the acceptable operational strain range 
for the sensor. A typical strain gauge sensor will operate such that the sensed 
strain is on or around the median of the operational range. A strain gauge sensor 
provides readings in the form of high and low polarity voltage. The Shimmer 
sensor follows this convention and provides milliVolt readings in a CSV file. A 
strain gauge sensor also possesses imperfections which are reflected in the sensed 
and real strains experienced by the sensor. 
3.2 HARDWARE IMPERFECTION ANALYSIS 
Detecting the imperfections in a sensor through its readings requires 
comprehensive analysis of both the device and the embedded sensors. Not all 
sensors can be used for generating a hardware identification. There can be many 
(a) (b) (c) 
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reasons for this like some sensors do not possess adequate distinguishable features. 
Even if a sensor has distinguishable features an attacker maybe able to replicate 
the readings by placing another sensor in the vicinity of the target sensor so that 
very similar readings can be obtained [106]. Therefore a process is required that 
allows us to identify a sensor imperfection using implicit features which cannot 
be predicted or recreated by an attacker. 
Hardware devices possess imperfections which are introduced when the 
hardware is being fabricated. When MEMS sensors are mounted onto the main 
board, stresses are applied which causes a permanent bias. Similarly, when a 
sensor is under operation its output accuracy is influenced by inconspicuous 
damages due to mishandling [107] and even the operational temperature [108]. 
Research [109] on MEMS reliability and failure methods has shown that there are 
ten individual types of mechanical influences that cause sensor bias while the 
electrical integrity is maintained. The bias in a sensor varies from sensor to sensor 
and is reflected in the readings obtained from the sensor. Calibrations attempt to 
compensate for the error in the readings by incorporating a linear value into the 
raw values obtained from the sensor. Recent research [12][110][111][112][113][114] 
on various sensors shows that it is possible to use the imperfections in a sensor 
to uniquely identify a device. Using sensor imperfections in conjunction with the 
ICMetric technology is a novel concept which this research explores with various 
types of MEMS sensors. Previous researches utilize the sensor bias for only 
identifying a device. The ICMetric technology is the first to utilize the sensor 
features and bias as a unique identification which is used as a basis for 
cryptographic services. 
Computation devices possess many features which can be used to identify 
a device. The problem with using device features is that some features are too 
difficult to extract while other features may not uniquely identify a device. 
Generating an ICMetric for a device involves identifying features which can be 
reproduced only by the device. Below are some definitions necessary to 
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understand how the implicit features of a device are collected from a MEMS 
sensor. 
Definition 3.1. In statistics the bias is defined as the difference between the test 
result and the expected result. Hence the bias in a measuring instrument is the 
result of single or multiple systematic errors in the system [115]. 
Definition 3.2. Conditions in which independent test results are obtained with the 
same method on identical test items in the same laboratory by the same operator 
using the same equipment within a short interval of time. Hence the repeatability 
of a set of readings holds if precision is observed under the stated repeatability 
conditions [115]. 
Definition 3.3. Conditions where independent test results are obtained with the 
same method on identical test items in different laboratories with different 
operators using different equipment. Hence the reproducibility of a set of readings 
holds if precision is observed under the stated reproducibility conditions [115]. 
Different instances of the same device integrated with the same sensor will 
result in different readings being extracted even when the same stimulus is being 
provided [116]. Every sensor has a bias which can be verified by checking the 
output against a standard stimulus. Choice of a stimulus requires an investigation 
into whether the stimulus is easily created when required. Since the ICMetric 
should be generated without user intervention therefore a stimulus is required 
which does not require special apparatus or unusual actions by a user. For 
instance, the magnetometer bias can be used for generating an ICMetric but this 
particular sensor is greatly affected by the presence of electrical appliances like 
monitors, speakers, etc. The magnetometer is also affected by communication 
signals and flowing electric current. Therefore to use the magnetometer, an 
additional device is needed which would function like a Faraday cage. The 
purpose of the construct would be to isolate the magnetometer from external 
influences. Obviously, doing so would increase the complexity of the ICMetric 
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generation and greatly reduce the practicality of the system. Table 3.1 shows 
components that possess imperfections but are not suitable for ICMetric 
generation due to technical reasons. 
Table 3.1. Common components, their imperfections and why these 
imperfections are not suitable for creating an ICMetric 
Component Imperfection Discard Reason 
Magnetometer Magnetic bias 
Bias recreation and environmental 
influences on sensor 
Clock skew 
Idiosyncrasy in crystal 
oscillator 
Low margin of error 
Touchscreen 
Touchscreen 
misalignment 
Difficult to determine imperfection 
Camera Camera noise pattern Limited inter device bias 
GPS 
Time skew between 
receivers 
Not reproducible due to GPS latency 
Flash Memory Program disturbs Need for a power cycle 
The imperfections in a device are not limited to MEMS sensors. For 
instance the flash memory in a device has imperfections called program disturbs 
[117] which is the result of electrical stresses that are applied when programming 
other memory cells in the array. Program disturbs are not only rare occurrences 
but also require a device to power cycle (power off and power on) every time an 
identification is to be generated [118]. The need for a power cycle is counter 
intuitive and may not be suitable for healthcare devices or when a device has a 
long power cycle. 
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3.2.1 Experimental Details 
To confirm whether a unique bias exists in the MEMS sensors, a sensor test bed 
is assembled which consists of five identical Shimmer sensors. Figure 3.4 shows 
the sensor testbed with one sensor plugged into a charging base station. 
 
Figure 3.4. The sensor testbed composed of five identical Shimmer sensors 
3.2.1.1 Methodology 
To determine the bias in a sensor, 1500 individual calibrated 
readings per sensor axis are extracted. The readings are then used to create 
a frequency distribution which will result in a histogram that exhibits 
unimodal distribution [119]. A unimodal distribution is an asymmetric 
statistical distribution that possesses a single unique mode. Every normal 
distribution is a unimodal distribution, but every unimodal distribution is 
not a normal distribution. 
The number of readings required is dependent on factors like 
sampling rate and accuracy of the sensor. Taking too little or too many 
readings is a concern since taking less number of readings may not 
adequately provide insight into the sensor behaviour. Whereas taking too 
many readings requires additional effort and will make insignificant events 
seem significant. Analysis shows that the number of readings influences 
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the stability of the mean when compared to a target mean value. As the 
number of readings increases the stability of the statistic credentials is also 
attained. Figure 3.5 shows the effect number of readings has on the sample 
mean acceleration. Mean acceleration of the entire population is computed 
and used as a target mean or reference point. This target mean is used to 
determine how many readings are sufficient to attain statistical stability. 
Analysis shows that if the sampling is carried out under strict conditions 
then approximately 300 readings can be used to determine the bias in the 
sensor. A small sample size may not be adequate in situations where there 
is a risk of the sample getting contaminated. 
 
Figure 3.5. Number of readings versus the population mean acceleration 
Sturges rule can be used to determine how many individual classes 
are required for the frequency distribution. Since the total number of 
sensor readings 𝑁 is 1500 then, according to the Sturges rule the number 
of classes 𝑘 is calculated as follows: 
𝑘 = 1 + 3.3×(𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑁) 
𝑘 = 11.48 
(5) 
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Based on the Sturges rule, 11 classes in the frequency distribution 
are created. After creating the histogram it is subjected to statistical 
analysis to prove that each sensor has a unique bias. The histograms follow 
a unimodal distribution which is then analysed using statistical measures 
like mean, standard deviation, confidence interval, kurtosis and skewness. 
To prove that the distributions are unimodal the readings are analysed 
using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test [120]. The test confirms that the 
sensor readings do not follow the normal curve. Statistical measures 
provide insight into the uniqueness of the sensor bias. The mean of a 
population shows where an average reading would lie in the population. 
The standard deviation indicates how widely dispersed the readings are 
compared to the population mean. Hence a low standard deviation 
indicates that the data points are close to the mean. The kurtosis shows 
how much the data set differs from a normal distribution. If the readings 
of a sensor follow a normal distribution closely then the kurtosis will be 
zero. A positive and negative kurtosis shows how much the peaks and tails 
differ from a normal distribution. Another strong indicator of how the 
readings are distributed is the skewness. If the skewness is negative then 
the tail of the distribution points to the left of the graph and vice versa. If 
the skewness is zero then this indicates that the distribution is symmetric 
i.e. the tail does not point to the left or right. 
Statisticians often question where the mean would lie in a 
population based on a certain confidence level. This type of indication is 
of particular importance when a curve does not follow the normal 
distribution. The confidence interval determines the interval in which the 
population mean would lie based on a confidence level. There are three 
common confidence levels i.e. 90%, 95% and 99%. A higher confidence level 
increases the interval width so that it can be said with high precision that 
the resulting interval contains the population mean. Therefore, a trade-off 
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needs to be made between being confident and widening the confidence 
interval [121]. To prove the uniqueness of the bias found in MEMS sensors 
the 95% confidence interval has been used. If ?̅? is the mean, 𝑁 is the 
number of readings and 𝜎 is the standard deviation then the 95% 
confidence interval 𝐶𝐼 is given in equation 6. Here the numeric value 1.96 
is the confidence coefficient for the 95% confidence interval.  
𝐶𝐼 = ?̅? ± 1.96×
𝜎
√𝑁
 (6) 
 To show that there is a significant difference between the axes of a 
sensor, analysis of variance (ANOVA) is conducted based on a single 
factor. The most important indicator of statistical significance in ANOVA 
is the p-value. The p-value of a sample forms the basis for the acceptance 
or rejection of the null hypothesis (there is no significant difference 
between populations). The p-value ranges between zero and one where low 
values indicate that there is a statistically significant difference existing in 
the values. If the probability equals one then this implies that statistically 
there is no significant difference between the set of readings [122][123]. A 
lower value approaching zero will indicate that the readings are 
significantly different from each other. 
3.2.2 Accelerometer Bias Analysis 
The Shimmer sensor is embedded with a tri-axial Freescale MMA7260Q 
[124] MEMS accelerometer. This accelerometer is a low cost micro machined 
sensor that has a sensitivity from 1.5g to 6g. 
To determine the bias in an accelerometer the Shimmer sensor is placed 
on a stable surface free from movements and vibrations. Precautions are taken 
that the sensor is not placed near or on an operating electronic appliance as this 
contaminates the resulting readings due to vibrations. The stimulus for assessing 
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the accelerometer bias is subjecting it to 0 m/sec2. This stimulus is easy to 
recreate by a user as there are many occasions when the sensor is left on a stable 
surface. An advantage of this stimulus is that a specialized device is not required 
for assessing the bias in the sensor. Under ideal conditions the readings from a 
sensor should be equal to the stimulus provided to the sensor. Experiments show 
that this is not the case and that each axis possesses a unique bias which is 
reflected in the readings. Experiments also confirm that the bias in the 
accelerometer is unique and reproducible provided the stimulus remains the same. 
The accelerometer bias is a good implicit feature because it cannot be 
predicted for any particular sensor. Further testing confirms that there is 
sufficient statistical variances in the histograms obtained from the sensors. The 
statistical variances between different sensors makes the accelerometer bias an 
attractive implicit feature for ICMetric generation. Figures 3.6 - 3.14 show the 
calibrated acceleration histograms obtained from three identical Shimmer sensors 
bearing identifications 3B56, 3B79 and 3B81. From the graphs it is evident that 
each axis exhibits a different bias and that there is neither a similarity between 
the sensors nor a correlation between the individual axes. 
 
Figure 3.6. Calibrated x-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B56 
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Figure 3.7. Calibrated y-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B56 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Calibrated z-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B56 
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Figure 3.9. Calibrated x-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B79 
 
 
Figure 3.10. Calibrated y-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B79 
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Figure 3.11. Calibrated z-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B79 
 
 
Figure 3.12. Calibrated x-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B81 
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Figure 3.13. Calibrated y-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B81 
 
 
Figure 3.14. Calibrated z-axis acceleration histogram for sensor 3B81 
The bias varies for each individual axis and no correlation has been seen 
between the individual axes or sensors. Figure 3.15 is a superimposed graph of 
individual accelerometer axis readings. The graph shows that each axis is unique 
and exhibits a unimodal distribution. Similar observations were obtained for the 
full set of Shimmer sensors used in the experiments. 
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Figure 3.15. Superimposed accelerometer histogram for sensor 3B56 
Statistical analysis of the accelerometer histograms proves that each sensor 
possesses a unique bias. The p-value also confirms that there is significant 
difference in readings obtained from the sensor. Given in table 3.2 – 3.4 is the 
statistical analysis of the readings obtained from three identical Shimmer 
accelerometers. 
Table 3.2. Statistical analysis of 3B56 tri-axial accelerometer sensor 
 Sensor 3B56 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Mean -0.43432 0.64801 8.09927 
Standard deviation 0.07083 0.07117 0.07093 
Skewness 0.01077 -0.11039 0.04483 
Confidence interval 
-0.43791 
to 
-0.43074 
0.64442  
to 
0.65162 
8.09568 
to 
8.10286 
Kurtosis 0.01234 0.05141 -0.01994 
p-value 0.00 
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Table 3.3. Statistical analysis of 3B79 tri-axial accelerometer sensor 
 Sensor 3B79 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Mean -1.17590 0.00786 8.32627 
Standard deviation 0.10649 0.11166 0.12268 
Skewness 0.32939 0.30758 0.53298 
Confidence interval 
-1.18129 
to 
-1.17051 
0.00723 
to 
0.00849 
8.32006 
to 
8.33248 
Kurtosis 0.24464 0.42474 0.64909 
p-value 0.00 
Table 3.4. Statistical analysis of 3B81 tri-axial accelerometer sensor 
 Sensor 3B81 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Mean -0.69565 0.59959 8.08433 
Standard deviation 0.06769 0.08915 0.11850 
Skewness 0.00793 -0.06997 0.11518 
Confidence interval 
-0.69908 
to  
-0.69223 
0.59508  
to 
0.60410 
8.07833 
to 
8.09033 
Kurtosis 0.08851 -0.13534 0.16224 
p-value 0.00 
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3.2.3 Gyroscope Bias Analysis 
The Shimmer is embedded with a gyroscope sensor which measures 
rotations per second. To assess the bias in the gyroscope the sensor is subjected 
to a stimulus similar to that of the accelerometer. The stimulus for a gyroscope 
is applied by placing the gyroscope on a stable surface free from rotations and 
movements thus 0 deg/sec. This stimulus functions as a comparison point for all 
the readings obtained from the sensor. Under ideal conditions the readings from 
the gyroscope sensor should be equal to the stimulus. Repeated experiments show 
that this is not the case and that each axis of the gyroscope possesses a unique 
bias. The bias in the sensor is unique and reproducible provided the stimulus 
remains the same. The reading from the sensors confirm that there is sufficient 
statistical variances in the unimodal distributions obtained from the sensors. The 
statistical variances between different sensors makes the gyroscope bias an 
attractive implicit feature for ICMetric generation. Figures 3.15 - 3.23 show the 
calibrated gyroscope histograms obtained from three identical Shimmer sensors 
bearing identifications 3B51, 3B56, 3B79. From the graphs it is evident that each 
axis exhibits a different bias and that there is neither a similarity between the 
sensors nor a correlation between any axes. 
 
Figure 3.16. Calibrated x-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B51 
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Figure 3.17. Calibrated y-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B51 
 
 
Figure 3.18. Calibrated z-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B51 
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Figure 3.19. Calibrated x-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B56 
 
 
Figure 3.20. Calibrated y-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B56 
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Figure 3.21. Calibrated z-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B56 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Calibrated x-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B79 
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Figure 3.23. Calibrated y-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B79 
 
 
Figure 3.24. Calibrated z-axis gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B79 
The bias varies for each individual axis and no correlation has been seen 
between the individual axes or sensors. Figure 3.25 is a superimposed graph of 
individual gyroscope axis readings. The graph shows that each axis is unique and 
exhibits a unimodal distribution. Similar observations were obtained for the full 
set of Shimmer sensors used in the experiments. 
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Figure 3.25. Superimposed gyroscope histogram for sensor 3B51 
Statistical analysis of the gyroscope histograms proves that each sensor 
possesses a unique bias. The p-value also confirms that there is significant 
difference in readings obtained from the sensor. Given in table 3.5 – 3.7 is the 
statistical analysis of the readings from three identical Shimmer gyroscopes. 
Table 3.5. Statistical analysis of 3B51 tri-axial gyroscope sensor 
 Sensor 3B51 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Mean -127.81196 -135.25128 -147.56654 
Standard deviation 16.48308 23.20079 24.14309 
Skewness 0.02725 0.02601 0.09415 
Confidence 
interval 
-128.64634 
to 
-126.97759 
-136.42570 
to 
-134.07686 
-148.78866 
to 
-146.34442 
Kurtosis -0.44354 -0.83918 -0.79749 
p-value 0.00 
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Table 3.6. Statistical analysis of 3B56 tri-axial gyroscope sensor 
 Sensor 3B56 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Mean -143.95750 -152.98412 -145.04249 
Standard deviation 15.84492 23.64065 22.81164 
Skewness 0.03387 0.09183 0.00498 
Confidence 
interval 
-144.75958 
to 
-143.15544 
-154.18081 
to 
-151.78744 
-146.19721 
to 
-143.88777 
Kurtosis -0.45522 -0.85886 -0.77233 
p-value 0.00 
Table 3.7. Statistical analysis of 3B79 tri-axial gyroscope sensor 
 Sensor 3B79 
x-axis y-axis z-axis 
Mean -137.88913 -146.95286 -139.27032 
Standard deviation 16.33432 23.80630 23.63067 
Skewness 0.11677 0.07350 -0.00196 
Confidence 
interval 
-138.71597 
to 
-137.06229 
-148.15794 
to 
-145.74780 
-140.46651 
to 
-138.07415 
Kurtosis -0.50523 -0.73155 -0.82448 
p-value 0.00 
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3.2.4 Strain Gauge Bias Analysis 
The strain gauge sensor is by design a delicate sensor. The MEMS sensor 
is designed to detect strains that it experiences. When a strain gauge sensor is 
mounted or screwed into a plastic casing this could introduce a deformation which 
is exhibited in the readings. Under ideal conditions the strain gauge should 
accurately show the strain on the sensor. Thus if the sensor is left on a stable 
surface with no external influences then the sensor should show that no strains 
are being applied. Experiments on the strain gauge sensor show that the sensor 
possesses a bias which is reflected in the readings. The strain gauge in the 
Shimmer sensor is a dual polarity sensor. Hence the sensor provides as output 
two readings i.e. high and low polarity measured in mVolts. Figures 3.24 – 3.29 
show the calibrated strain gauge histograms obtained from three identical 
Shimmer sensors bearing identifications 3B51, 3B81 and 3B4B. From the graphs 
it is evident that each axis exhibits a different bias and that there is neither a 
similarity between the sensors nor a correlation between any axes. 
 
Figure 3.26. Calibrated strain gauge high polarity histogram for sensor 3B51 
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Figure 3.27. Calibrated strain gauge low polarity histogram for sensor 3B51 
 
 
Figure 3.28. Calibrated strain gauge high polarity histogram for sensor 3B81 
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Figure 3.29. Calibrated strain gauge low polarity histogram for sensor 3B81 
 
 
Figure 3.30. Calibrated strain gauge high polarity histogram for sensor 3B4B 
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Figure 3.31. Calibrated strain gauge low histogram for sensor 3B4B 
The bias varies for each individual axis and there is no correlation between 
two axes or sensors. Figure 3.31 is a superimposed graph of individual strain 
gauge sensor readings. The graph shows that each axis is unique and exhibits a 
unimodal distribution. Similar observations were obtained for the full set of 
Shimmer sensors used in the experiments. 
 
Figure 3.32. Superimposed strain gauge histogram for sensor 3B56 
Statistical analysis of the strain gauge histograms proves that each sensor 
possesses a unique bias. Given in table 3.8 – 3.10 is a statistical analysis of 
readings from three Shimmer strain gauge sensors. 
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Table 3.8. Statistical analysis of 3B51 strain gauge sensor 
 Sensor 3B51 
High polarity Low polarity 
Mean 0.99965 0.41427 
Standard deviation 0.03103 0.09056 
Skewness 0.00846 -0.07965 
Confidence interval 
0.99809 
to 
1.00123 
0.40969 
to 
0.41886 
Kurtosis -0.67545 -0.82690 
p-value 0.00 
Table 3.9. Statistical analysis of 3B81 strain gauge sensor 
 Sensor 3B81 
High polarity Low polarity 
Mean 0.94635 0.13937 
Standard deviation 0.00581 0.00679 
Skewness -1.28768 -0.48479 
Confidence interval 
0.94606 
to 
0.94665 
0.13903 
to 
0.13972 
Kurtosis 2.72895 4.19192 
p-value 0.00 
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Table 3.10. Statistical analysis of 3B4B strain gauge sensor 
 Sensor 3B4B 
High polarity Low polarity 
Mean 0.99176 0.36821 
Standard deviation 0.03003 0.09164 
Skewness -0.09299 -0.00982 
Confidence interval 
0.99024 
to 
0.99328 
0.36357 
to 
0.37285 
Kurtosis -0.83512 -0.75280 
p-value 0.00 
3.3 SENSOR EXPLICIT FEATURES 
A sensor like the Shimmer also possesses explicit features which can also 
be used for generating an ICMetric. Using only explicit features for the 
establishment of an ICMetric is a risk since these features may be easy to extract 
and spoof for an adversary. For instance the MAC address is often printed on the 
exterior of a device thus making spoofing an effortless task. This is precisely why 
the ICMetric should be based on a combination of explicit and implicit features. 
Using a combination of explicit and implicit features ensures that the resulting 
ICMetric is truly diverse. A comprehensive study on the explicit features 
possessed by the Shimmer sensor proves that the sensor is equipped with many 
unique features which are also possessed by other common devices and sensors. 
Given below are the features which can be used for generating an ICMetric: 
Sensor MAC address - A unique 48bit MAC address associated with each sensor. 
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Bluetooth radio identification - A modifiable 16bit hexadecimal identity used to 
identify a device when connecting via Bluetooth. 
Silicon serial identification - Each Shimmer sensor is embedded with a DS2411 
chip [96] which is intended to provide a serial identification. The DS2411 is a 
single line factory lasered chip which is designed for equipment registration, 
peripheral identification, module identification and network node identification. 
Being a single line identification module ensures that the chip identification 
cannot be modified by an attacker. The DS2411 is composed of three unique code 
elements that can be incorporated into the device ICMetric. Figure 3.30 shows 
the DS2411 serialization structure: 
 
CRC 
8 bit 
Serialization 
48 bit 
Family Code 
8 bit 
Figure 3.33. The DS-2411 serialization structure 
Calibration matrices - The Shimmer sensor attempts to generate accurate 
readings using an offset, sensitivity and alignment matrix. These three matrices 
make corrections and adjustments to the readings obtained from a sensor. If an 
adversary attempts to inaccurately predict/modify the calibration matrices it will 
result in the wrong readings being obtained from the sensor. Hence even the 
slightest difference in the calibration matrices will result in a chain of events 
where both the sensor readings and the related calibration matrix are incorrect. 
Figure 3.31 shows the calibration matrices with sample calibration values: 
-1  65535 0 0  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
-1  0 65535 0  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
-1  0 0 65535  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
(a)   (b)    (c)  
 
Figure 3.34. The calibration matrices with sample values (a) offset vector (b) 
sensitivity matrix (c) alignment matrix 
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3.4 KEYING ARCHITECTURES 
Keying in groups is a delicate matter because no precise definition of a 
group architecture has been given in the literature. Often group architectures are 
compared with applications like social networking, chat applications (Skype, 
FaceTime) and group based services (google, yahoo groups). The comparison of 
security based group collaboration with a commercially available system is 
slightly flawed. Group secure communication architectures are recognized by how 
keying operations are performed in a group setting. Factors worth considering are 
whether keying is performed collaboratively or is dictated by the group controller. 
Below are the two keying architectures identified for secure group communication. 
3.4.1 Dictative Keying 
In the dictative approach, keying responsibilities are given to a group 
controller or to the Key Generation Centre (KGC). It is not necessary that the 
controller is a fixed entity. A client can be given privileges to carry out the role 
of a group controller. The dictative architecture is mostly based on the use of a 
dictated key that is communicated to the group members. The problem with this 
technique is that the controller needs to be protected from attacks because if the 
controller is compromised then the group communication is dismantled. 
Furthermore, a monolithic architecture can be more devastating if an attack is 
successful on the group. In its original form this architecture has limited coherence 
with the ICMetric technology because using such a setup would mean that a 
group key is generated without taking ICMetric inputs from the individual group 
members. In dictative keying the KGC can certify that the keys have been 
generated with a good random number generation source and that the keys 
possess the required properties. Figure 3.32 is a generic representation of the 
dictative keying architecture with the keys being communicated to the clients. 
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Figure 3.35. The dictative keying architecture with a KGC 
communicating with clients in the group 
3.4.2 Contributive Keying 
In contributive keying, clients are required to provide contributions upon 
which keys are generated. The group controller or KGC is responsible for 
performing a computation on the provided data so that a key can be generated. 
Once the key is generated it is then communicated to the individual group 
members which function as clients. A vast advantage of the contributive 
architecture is that it allows the generation of a contributive key which is 
generated by taking inputs from individual members in the group. Since this 
architecture requires key transportation therefore it is susceptible to the man-in-
the-middle attack. Figure 3.33 is a generic representation of the contributive 
keying architecture with keys being generated collaboratively. 
 
Figure 3.36. The contributive keying architecture with a KGC 
communicating with clients in the group 
3.5 FRAMEWORK ASSUMPTIONS 
A multiparty environment is composed of multiple devices communicating 
with each other. A challenge when providing security in a multiparty environment 
is the presence of dishonest participants. When using the ICMetric technology in 
Client 
Controller/ KGC 
Client 
Controller/ KGC 
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the presence of dishonest participants, it is particularly important to ensure that 
the ICMetric of any device or the group is not exposed. 
A multiparty communication system is composed of multiple computation 
devices connected remotely. To administer the service of the group the proposed 
schemes require a KGC. The KGC plays an important role in a group setting 
because it is responsible for providing access when a device wishes to join the 
group, issue a new key to the group and perform rekeying whenever a device 
leaves the group. It is assumed that the devices in the group and the KGC are 
ICMetric capable. To protect from eavesdropping it is assumed that all 
communications are performed via secure channels. Figure 3.34 is a pictorial 
representation of the secure group communication. The various form of wearable 
and ubiquitous devices connects to the KGC to establish secure group 
communications. 
 
Figure 3.37. Basic system model for secure group communications 
3.6 CREATING A GROUP ICMETRIC 
An ICMetric identifies a single device based on its internal environment. 
A similar identification is required to identify a group of devices which are 
communicating in a secure group environment. This identification, called the 
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group ICMetric uniquely identifies the group and must be generated using the 
ICMetric of the individual devices that form the group. Besides providing an 
identification to the multiparty environment, the group ICMetric can also be used 
to administer cryptographic services. Generating the group ICMetric is a 
challenging task because it has to be generated using the individual device 
ICMetric. Besides this the following requirements make computing the group 
ICMetric an even complex task: 
• The ICMetric of any device must not be communicated to even trusted 
entities in the group. 
• The group ICMetric must not be communicated to any entity outside the 
group. 
• An adversary should not be able to recover the individual ICMetric of any 
device that forms the group. 
To generate the group ICMetric without exposing the individual ICMetric 
Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme is used. This scheme allows a number of 
individual members/ devices to construct the secret group ICMetric. 
To generate the group ICMetric the devices in the group will be sent a 
temporary salt 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝. This will be used by the device to generate a hash by adding 
its own ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 and the 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 as follows: 
𝑖𝑐ℎ = ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 + 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) (7) 
Each device in the group will send its 𝐼𝐷 and 𝑖𝑐ℎ to the KGC. Thus the KGC 
will maintain 𝐼𝐷 and 𝑖𝑐ℎ pairs i.e. (𝐼𝐷𝑥 , 𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑥). The responses obtained from the 
individual devices will be used to form the secret share points required for 
constructing the group ICMetric. 
{(𝐼𝐷1, 𝑖𝑐ℎ1), (𝐼𝐷2, 𝑖𝑐ℎ2), (𝐼𝐷3, 𝑖𝑐ℎ3), ⋯ , (𝐼𝐷𝑡, 𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑡)} (8) 
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The secret group ICMetric is constructed by using Lagrange interpolation. 
Lagrange polynomial is used with the previously assembled share points. The 
group ICMetric is assembled using the following polynomial: 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑔 = ∏(𝐼𝐷𝑗)
𝑡
𝑗=1
  ∑
𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑖
(𝑖𝑐ℎ − 𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑖) ∏ (𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑖 − 𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑗)
𝑡
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
𝑡
𝑖=1
 (9) 
Where 𝑡 is the number of individual pairs used for establishing the group 
ICMetric. 
3.7 IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES 
The accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge sensors in the Shimmer 
sensor have a sampling rate of 51.2Hz. Once the readings are obtained from the 
Shimmer sensor in a CSV file the readings are used to perform a statistical 
analysis of the readings of the sensor. The statistical analysis of the generated 
CSV file is performed in MATLAB. MATLAB takes 0.412 seconds to statistically 
analyse the CSV file using the accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge MEMS 
sensors. Experiments show that the sensors possess a unique repeatable bias. 
Statistically each sensor possesses unique characteristics which proves that the 
features can be used for ICMetric generation. 
3.8 FEATURE STABILITY 
The ICMetric technology and PUF rely heavily on the accurate extraction 
of device features. If the extracted feature readings are contaminated then the 
resulting device ICMetric and PUF methods will fail. Owing to this PUF research 
has tried to identify features that exhibit stability along with a reduced bit error 
rate [125]. There are limited experiments on the ICMetric technology owing to 
which research needs to be conducted on the effect of feature instability on 
ICMetric generation. Previous studies [90][91][92] have identified hardware 
features which can be used for ICMetric generation. Experiments show that the 
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Program Counter (PC) and Cycles Per Instructions (CPI) can used to generate 
an ICMetric. 
MEMS sensors are mechanical components owing to which they are 
susceptible to external factors which can be difficult to simulate in a laboratory. 
MEMS sensors can be affected by the humidity [126], operational temperature 
and physical shock [127][128]. Being mechanical in nature means that the moving 
components will wear over time and their resulting behaviour will change. MEMS 
sensors can be based on many individual mechanical components like springs, 
combs and shuttles. Each MEMS component will damage differently for instance 
springs will buckle or misalign while the conductor foil in a strain gauge can 
buckle permanently [129]. Mechanical and structural properties change when a 
MEMS sensor is mishandled. Hence dropping a sensor or subjecting it to abnormal 
conditions (fatigue, stress and strain) can damage a sensor permanently. 
If a sensor is studied minutely under a microscope numerous imperfections 
can be noticed as the device is subjected to everyday conditions. For instance 
particle contamination, debris, human hair, broken pin joints and missing linkages 
have been documented in literature [128]. Similarly a factor influencing the 
performance of all MEMS sensors is the presence of stiction. Any object that is 
in contact with another surface will require a minimum threshold to overcome 
static cohesion. If a sensor is unable to overcome stiction, it will not be able to 
respond to a supplied stimulus correctly [130]. 
Stability of features is a necessary requirement for generating the device 
ICMetric. If a sensor does not function as intended then it will result in the wrong 
ICMetric being generated. This will eventually lead to authentication failure and 
wrong cryptographic keys being generated. As this is beyond the scope of this 
research therefore it is worth exploring how the aging of a MEMS device 
influences the ICMetric of a device. Perhaps owing to their small size the effect 
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of temperature was not prevalent in the Shimmer sensor. The same cannot be 
said for powerful and computationally complex devices. 
3.9 SUMMARY 
The ICMetric technology has been designed as a method of deterring 
cryptographic key theft. By design the ICMetric is an identification which can be 
used to identify a device based on its internal environment. Key generation, 
authentication and many other cryptographic services will be based on the 
ICMetric of a device therefore it is important to use features that are unique, 
repeatable and reproducible. This chapter presents a study on both explicit and 
implicit features that can be used for the creation of a device ICMetric. Modern 
embedded systems are often equipped with MEMS sensors like the accelerometer, 
gyroscope and strain gauge. Although these are precision sensors they possess a 
bias which can be seen in the readings obtained from the sensors. Experiments 
on the body wearable Shimmer sensor show that each sensor possesses a unique 
bias which can be analysed statistically. This chapter statistically studies the 
readings from embedded MEMS sensors to prove that there is a unique bias in 
every sensor. Experiments show that the sensor bias is an implicit feature which 
can be used for ICMetric generation. To strengthen the ICMetric, explicit features 
can also be used with implicit features. This chapter explores a range of explicit 
features which can be used like MAC address, identifications, calibration matrices 
etc. 
The chapter proposes a system architecture where multiple devices connect 
to a single group controller. This group controller is an intermediary which is 
responsible for establishing the secure group communications. A goal of this 
research is to establish secure group communications using the ICMetric 
technology. This chapter proposes a scheme which uses the individual device 
ICMetric to create a group ICMetric. The group ICMetric is assembled using 
Shamir Secret Sharing scheme and holds the same properties held by the 
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individual device ICMetric. The group ICMetric forms a secret identification for 
the group which can be used for the creation of symmetric and asymmetric keys 
for the group. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
SYMMETRIC KEY BASED GROUP 
COMMUNICATION 
 
 
Secure group communication requires the establishment of a cryptographic 
key which can be used for a range of cryptographic services like encryption/ 
decryption. In the lifecycle of a cryptographic key the key generation is the most 
important phase. A cryptosystem can be considered weak if the key generation, 
key exchange or the key storage is flawed. Creating a cryptographic key is a 
challenging task especially in the multiparty environment because keys need to 
be generated securely and efficiently. Two types of keying exist in cryptography 
i.e. symmetric key and asymmetric key. This chapter explores the creation of a 
symmetric key for a multiparty environment using the ICMetric technology. The 
group ICMetric cannot be used as a cryptographic key, therefore schemes are 
required which can produce a cryptographic key from the group ICMetric. A 
challenge while generating the symmetric key is that the cryptographic key should 
be generated using the group ICMetric but this should not compromise the 
security of group or its members. Hence the proposed algorithm builds on sound 
cryptographic principles and ensures that the properties of the ICMetric 
4.1 SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
81 
 
technology are not violated in any way. The proposed algorithm is based on 
Password Based Key Derivation Function. The function uses a number of atomic 
primitives like cryptographic salts, hashing, and a large iteration count to create 
an ICMetric based symmetric key. The greatest advantage of the symmetric key 
generation algorithm is that it is adaptable to varying key sizes. The symmetric 
key generation scheme has been simulated and tested for varying key sizes and 
iteration count. The chapter first introduces the primitives of the scheme after 
which the symmetric key generation scheme is presented. The chapter concludes 
with the simulation details and results. 
4.1 SYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Symmetric key algorithms use a paradigm where a single key is used for 
the provision of cryptographic services. Hence the symmetric key forms a shared 
secret between two or more parties. To successfully execute encryption and 
decryption all parties involved must use the same symmetric key. If Alice and 
Bob wish to share a secret they agree on a symmetric key. When Alice wishes to 
send a message (plaintext) she encrypts the message using the symmetric key. 
The resulting ciphertext is transmitted to Bob, who will use the symmetric key 
to extract the plaintext from the ciphertext. Clearly, any person who has access 
to the symmetric key can also perform the decryption. Figure 4.1 shows the 
working of a symmetric key for the provision of encryption and decryption. 
 
Figure 4.1. Encryption-decryption process using a symmetric key 
Alice Bob 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Same key is used for encryption and 
decryption 
Plaintext Plaintext Ciphertext 
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Definition 4.1. For encryption and decryption transformations {𝐸𝑒: 𝑒 ∈ 𝒦} and 
{𝐷𝑑: 𝑑 ∈ 𝒦} where 𝒦 is the key space, then under symmetric key cipher 𝑒 = 𝑑 
[22]. 
The symmetric key has an advantage that it is fast and a single key can 
be shared between a large number of individuals in a group setting. A concern 
while using symmetric keys is that if the key generation or key exchange process 
is compromised then the entire system is also compromised. Therefore a challenge 
with symmetric keys is communicating the key to the individual parties and then 
ensuring that the key remains secret. 
4.2 SCHEME PRIMITIVES 
The symmetric key generation scheme is based on a number of 
cryptographic primitives. Before providing a detailed description of how the 
symmetric key is generated it is important to throw light on the scheme 
primitives. 
4.2.1 Password Based Key Derivation Function 
A password is a string of characters chosen by a user to prove 
authentication so that access to a resource can be provided. A password on its 
own does not possess sufficient entropy owing to which it cannot be used as a 
cryptographic key. System designers attempt to increase the entropy of the 
password by suggesting an increase in the length of the password and also by 
suggesting incorporation of special characters and symbols. In many applications 
such as protecting data in a storage device the password is the only secret 
information upon which cryptographic services can be based. In such applications 
a method is required that takes as input a password and provides as output keying 
material which can be used for the provision of cryptographic services like 
authentication, access control etc. 
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Key Derivation Function (KDF) address the need for cryptographic key 
generation based on secret input. A KDF is a deterministic algorithm which is 
used to derive a cryptographic key based on secret information. A KDF can also 
be used to stretch or reduce the length of a key so that it conforms to the 
requirements of a cryptosystem. The derived keys from a KDF possess qualities 
like sufficient entropy, length and irreversibility owing to which KDF are an 
attractive tool in cryptography. 
A Password Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) is a KDF that takes 
as input a password and produces as output a cryptographic key. The PBKDF 
uses salt based hashing and a large iteration count to produce a symmetric key 
which can resist rainbow table attacks. Hence the input of a PBKDF is the secret 
input, salt and key length that produces a symmetric key of the desired key 
length. Figure 4.2 shows the generic diagram of a PBKDF. 
 
Figure 4.2. Generic flow diagram of PBKDF 
The secret input of PBKDF bears close resemblance to the properties of 
the ICMetric of a device. For instance the password is a secret phrase which 
cannot be transmitted, similarly the ICMetric is secret and cannot be transmitted. 
A quality of the PBKDF is that the large sized iteration count prevents an 
attacker from extracting the password from a key, thus preventing reversal. 
4.2.2 Cryptographic Salt 
Many security primitives are based on a source of randomness. Often this 
source of randomness is obtained by incorporating a salt into the scheme. In 
cryptography a salt is used as an additional input to a one way function. It is 
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mostly added as input to a hash function to make it difficult for an attacker to 
crack the output of the function [131]. This is achieved by incorporating random 
data (salt) so that the output hash can also be randomized. This property is 
particularly important in situations when a single input needs to be hashed in 
different instances to produce different hashes every time. 
The PBKDF algorithm requires a salt to operate. The purpose of a salt 
here is to defend against dictionary attacks and computed rainbow table attacks. 
The salt used in PBKDF must be at least 128 bits. By using PBKDF, a new key 
can be generated for every salt value even if the iteration count and secret input 
remain the same. This property makes it difficult for an attacker to generate a 
table of possible keys. For a given input password the number of possible keys is 
2𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑛, where 𝑠𝐿𝑒𝑛 is the salt length. The proposed ICMetric based symmetric key 
scheme uses a 128 bit salt. 
4.2.3 Hashed Message Authentication Code 
When transmitting or storing data in an insecure environment, the parties 
involved would want guarantees about the authenticity of the source and integrity 
of the data. To achieve this, Message Authentication Codes (MAC) use a shared 
secret key to generate a small data block that can be appended to the original 
message and sent. The data block is obtained by running the message through a 
MAC generation algorithm. When the receiver receives the message he computes 
the same MAC as a function of the original message. If the received and the 
computed MAC differ then it can be concluded that the message has been altered 
in some way. Since the secret key is only known to trusted parties therefore an 
attacker cannot alter a message and its associated MAC. This scheme ensures 
both authenticity of the sender and the integrity of the message. 
A MAC is based on a symmetric block cipher that lacks efficiency. 
Therefore a method is required that provides improved performance and 
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portability. An HMAC [132][133] is a keyed hash MAC which uses hashing instead 
of block ciphers to achieve improved performance and portability. Hash functions 
are typically faster than block ciphers and an HMAC is designed to work with all 
variants of SHA and MD. The HMAC is a lightweight algorithm which follows 
the same principle as that followed by a MAC. In an HMAC the key and message 
are both hashed to create a data block which can be appended to the original 
message and transmitted to the other party. Upon receipt the receiver will 
compute a hash on the message and the secret key. Equivalence of the computed 
HMAC and the received HMAC ensures that the message has not been altered 
and that the party sending the message is authentic. An HMAC is also preferred 
over a simple MAC as the appendable code is not intended to be encrypted. This 
provides justification for using the hash as an appropriate building block in a 
scheme. 
4.2.4 Iteration Count 
The iteration count is a numeric value which defines how many iterations 
are performed to generate the key. The iteration count is intended to make it 
difficult for an adversary to capture the keys of a system. Doing so also has an 
influence on the amount of computation required to generate the key for a 
legitimate user. While choosing the number of iterations it is important to 
establish a quantity which has low impact on user perceived performance but 
makes it difficult for an attacker to break the system. The NIST standard [134] 
targeting PBKDF suggests a minimum of 1000 iterations with an increased count 
where possible. The standard also recommends an iteration count of 10,000,000 
may be appropriate in situations where the user perceived performance is not 
critical. There are many applications where a higher iteration count has been 
recommended [135] and experimented with. For instance, Apple iOS 9.0 uses 
PBKDF with 10,000 iterations [136] for the iTunes application. As CPU power 
becomes increasingly inexpensive it has been recommended that the iteration 
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count should increase yearly at perhaps 40%-60% [135]. Choosing the number of 
iterations is dependent on the amount of resources available and the capability 
of the target computation device. 
4.3 ICMETRIC BASED SYMMETRIC KEY GENERATION 
As the ICMetric lacks size, entropy and necessary properties therefore it 
cannot be used as a cryptographic key [93]. Hence a scheme is required which 
allows ICMetric based secure symmetric key generation in a multiparty 
environment. The proposed scheme is intended to secure devices communicating 
in a multiparty environment. The scheme is founded on the ICMetric technology 
and composed of five different phases i.e. device imprinting, device 
authentication, group ICMetric generation, symmetric key generation and stream 
confidentiality. Table 4.1 provides a description of the symbols and variables used 
in the scheme. 
Table 4.1. Symbols and variables used in the scheme 
Symbol Meaning 
⊕ Bitwise exclusive OR 
∥ Concatenation 
⌈ ⌉ Ceiling function 
𝑖𝑐ℎ Hashed ICMetric 
𝑠 128 bit random salt 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑, 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝐾𝐺𝐶 ICMetric of device and KGC respectively 
𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑔 ICMetric of the group 
𝐼𝐷𝑥 Identity associated with device 𝑥 
𝐶 Iteration count; minimum 1000 
𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑛 Length of master key in bits 
ℎ𝑙𝑒𝑛 Digest size of hash function 
𝑏𝑒(𝑥) 32-bit encoding of integer 𝑥. Significant bit appears on left 
𝑚𝑘 Master key 
4.3.1 Device Imprinting 
The first step for establishing the group is imprinting [137]. The step is 
aimed at resolving the issue of establishing trust between two distrusting devices. 
The process mimics the duckling imprinting phase where a newborn duckling 
establishes a pattern with its parents. 
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When a device wishes to join a group it will first need to register with the 
KGC. The KGC is responsible for coordinating and supporting the presence of 
the group and its individual members. When a device wishes to join the group, 
the device will compute a hash of its ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑 and send it to the KGC as 
follows: 
ℎ = ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ (𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑑) (10) 
This value of ℎ is discarded by the device but is stored by the KGC for 
future authentication. 
4.3.2 Device Authentication 
To prove authenticity, the device will compute a hash of ℎ and a temporary 
salt 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 issued by the KGC. The device will respond by computing: 
ℎ1 = ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(ℎ + 𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝) (11) 
The KGC will compute the same and compare the resulting value with 
that provided by the device. If both values are identical then the device will be 
authenticated. Upon successful authentication each device will be allocated a 
unique identity 𝐼𝐷, which will help in establishing the group ICMetric as outlined 
in chapter 3. 
4.3.3 Password Based Symmetric Key Derivation 
The symmetric key generation scheme uses PBKDF with the group 
ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑔 to generate a master key 𝑚𝑘 of length 𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑛 which is used for 
confidentiality services. The key length 𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑛 can be modified to conform with 
the needs of the encryption algorithm utilized for confidentiality. The proposed 
algorithm also takes as input the digest length ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑛. A modifiable key length and 
an adaptable HMAC scheme allows the algorithm to conform to changing 
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cryptographic requirements. The flow diagram for symmetric key generation is 
given in figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3. The PBKDF schematic showing the generation of a symmetric key 
using the group ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑔 
Since all involved parties and the KGC possess the same group ICMetric 
therefore it can be concluded that using the group ICMetric will result in a single 
symmetric key for all parties in the group. The PBKDF algorithm takes as input 
the password (group ICMetric), salt, iteration count and required key length. The 
symmetric key generation algorithm has a constraint that the length of the final 
key should be at most (232 − 1)×ℎ𝐿𝑒𝑛. 
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This ICMetric based symmetric key algorithm creates a symmetric key 𝑚𝑘 
of length 𝑘𝐿𝑒𝑛 for the group. The key can be used for encrypting and decrypting 
messages that are being communicated in the group setting. 
4.4 IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES 
The proposed symmetric key generation scheme has been implemented and 
tested on Intel Core i5 3.4GHz processor computer with 6GB RAM. The MEMS 
readings are obtained from the Shimmer sensor while authentication, group 
ICMetric generation, symmetric key generation and confidentiality schemes have 
been implemented in Bloodshed Dev-C [138] and MATLAB. Cryptographic 
functionalities are provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic library [139]. 
The proposed system is composed of four subcategories each targeting a 
different components. The system is composed of the following modules: 
If (kLen>(232-1)×hLen) 
 Return with error 
len=⌈kLen/hLen⌉ 
r=kLen-(len-1)×hLen 
for (i=1 to kLen) 
{ 
Ti=0 
U0=s ∥ be(i) 
for(j=1 to C) 
{ 
 Uj=HMAC(icmg,Uj-1) 
 Ti=ti ⊕ Uj 
 } 
} 
Return mk=(T1∥T2∥ ⋯ ∥TkLen) 
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• ICMetric generation – A module dedicated to creating a group ICMetric from 
ICMetric of the group devices. 
• Authentication – A module designed to authenticate the individual devices 
in the group environment. 
• Key generation – A PBKDF scheme that generates keys of varying sizes i.e. 
128, 256, 512, 1024 bits. 
• Confidentiality – Two stream cipher modules i.e. Rabbit stream cipher and 
AES (128 and 256 bit). 
4.4.1 Outcomes 
Once the ICMetric has been generated, the device will use authentication 
services to get itself authenticated using its ICMetric. The authentication scheme 
contains two occurrences of the SHA256 function and takes 5×10-3 seconds to run. 
The group ICMetric generation is based on Shamir Secret Sharing Scheme. This 
module requires 1.5×10-3 seconds to run top-down. Figure 4.4 shows the time 
required for statistical analysis in ICMetric generation, authentication and the 
group ICMetric generation. 
 
Figure 4.4. Graph showing time (seconds) taken by the modules of the 
scheme 
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The PBKDF is influenced by two parameters i.e. the key size and the 
number of iterations. To study the performance of this algorithm four common 
keys were generated using varying number of iterations and key sizes. The 
generated key sizes were 128, 256, 512, 1024 bits while the tested iteration count 
is 1000, 2000 and 4000. Table 4.2 shows the time taken by the PBKDF when 
subjected to varying key sizes and iteration count. 
Table 4.2. Time taken by PBKDF with varying key size and iteration count 
 Key Size 
(bits) 
Key Generation 
Time (seconds) 
It
er
a
ti
o
n
 C
o
u
n
t 
1000 
128 0.019 
256 0.040 
512 0.081 
1024 0.160 
2000 
128 0.041 
256 0.080 
512 0.146 
1024 0.310 
4000 
128 0.093 
256 0.166 
512 0.328 
1024 0.588 
An analysis of the key generation algorithm shows that the 1024 bit key 
with 4000 iterations requires the most time to operate. Further analysis shows 
that the 1000 and 2000 iterations creates keys with a moderate time requirement. 
Increasing the number of iterations from 2000 to 4000 iterations impacts the time 
required by the system. Analysis shows that doubling the key size approximately 
doubles the time required for key generation provided the iteration count remain 
the same. Figure 4.5 shows the graph depicting the effect of key size and iterations 
on time requirements. 
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Figure 4.5. Graph showing time (seconds) taken by the various key 
sizes with a varying iteration count 
The confidentiality module has been tested with two widely recognized 
encryption algorithms i.e. Rabbit stream cipher and AES. The rabbit stream 
cipher [140] has a single variant that requires a 128 bit key with a 64 bit 
initialization vector to run and requires only 7×10-6 seconds to run top down. 
Given in figure 4.6 is a graph showing the time taken by the individual encryption 
schemes and their variants. 
The AES encryption [141] module is composed of two variants i.e. 128 bit 
and 256 bit. The 128 bit variant requires 3.6×10-6 seconds to run; while the 256 
bit variant requires 5.1×10-6 seconds. 
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Figure 4.6. Graph showing time (seconds) taken by the Rabbit stream 
cipher and the AES variants 
4.4.2 Scheme Analysis 
The proposed scheme aims to provide a symmetric key for a multiparty 
environment. A single generated symmetric key is intended to be used by all 
parties of the group. The scheme offers forward and backward key secrecy because 
a new group ICMetric is generated whenever a participant joins or leaves the 
group. The joining or leaving of a group member triggers key revocation and a 
fresh symmetric key is generated for the group. 
By incorporating secure channels and the ICMetric technology into the 
scheme discourages passive eavesdropping and man in the middle attack. To 
further strengthen the scheme noteworthy cryptographic elements have been 
incorporated like random salts and a large iteration count. Incorporating salts 
into the key generation algorithm defeats dictionary based attacks on the system 
and also ensures that a new key is generated every time even if the group 
membership remains the same. The iteration count is a crucial parameter of the 
PBKDF algorithm as an excessively large iteration count increases the time 
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required to generate the key. Therefore a decision of how large an iteration count 
should depend on the application demand, system capabilities and time 
restrictions. PBKDF is an adaptable algorithm that allows designers to generate 
keys by specifying the required key length, associated secret input and the salt 
value at run time. Flexibility in design can increase the practicality of the system 
as varying key sizes can be generated based on application requirements. 
Provision of strong authentication and key generation does not ensure a 
fully secure system therefore it has been studied in combination with two 
prominent confidentiality schemes AES and Rabbit. 
4.5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Studying the PBKDF algorithm with the ICMetric technology is a novel 
concept that has not been explored previously. The simulation results of the 
proposed symmetric key scheme is compared to a healthcare sensing system [95] 
based on the ICMetric technology. The system is a one to one scheme that 
provides ICMetric based authentication and access control. The system also offers 
AES based encryption by using symmetric keys. Since the system was intended 
for one to one communication therefore the scheme is not constituent of a group 
ICMetric module. The scheme is initiated with the establishment of an ICMetric, 
followed by generation of the symmetric key. This symmetric key is then used to 
provide confidentiality services. The authors have simulated the scheme and their 
projected time consumption can be compared to the time requirements of the 
schemes proposed in this chapter. Authentication services and key exchange is 
carried out by a Secure Remote Password scheme and hence the authors have 
not provided a dedicated module for authentication. Table 4.3 below provides the 
time taken by this scheme and a rivalling scheme also based on ICMetric 
technology. As the contending scheme does not simulate all modules therefore 
absent details have been represented with a dash. 
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Table 4.3. A running time (seconds) comparison of the proposed symmetric key 
scheme with an ICMetric based one to one healthcare system 
 Proposed scheme 
ICMetric based one to one 
scheme 
Group ICMetric 
generation 
1.5 × 10-3 sec - 
Authentication 5.0 × 10
-3 sec - 
Symmetric key 
generation 
1000 iterations 
160 bit 256 bit 512 bit 
128 bit 256 bit 512 bit 
1.9×10-2 
sec 
4.0×10-2 
sec 
8.1×10-2 
sec 
2.65×10-3 
sec 
3.6×10-3 
sec 
3.85×10-3 
sec 
AES 128 3.6 × 10-6 sec 3.1 × 10-6 sec 
AES 256 5.10 × 10-5 sec - 
Rabbit 
encryption 
7.0 × 10-6 sec - 
4.6 SUMMARY 
The ICMetric technology has been conceived to form a secure foundation 
upon which cryptographic schemes can be built. This chapter demonstrates that 
it is possible to generate symmetric keys that are based on ICMetric. The 
symmetric key generation scheme unifies the ICMetric technology and prominent 
cryptographic elements like PBKDF, hashing, cryptographic salts, AES and 
Rabbit. The ICMetric technology deters key theft by using the features of a 
sensor. The proposed scheme provides authentication by using the device 
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ICMetric. When authentication happens in a group setting an environment is 
created where only authenticated devices can communicate and share resources. 
The key generation scheme uses the group ICMetric to generate a 
symmetric key using PBKDF. By incorporating PBKDF into the scheme design 
creates an adaptable method that allows creating cryptographic keys of variable 
size. The PBKDF also takes as parameter an iteration count. The iteration count 
increases the amount of computation required to generate a key thus making it 
difficult for an attacker to capture the key. By incorporating cryptographic salts 
throughout the designed system it deters dictionary based brute force attacks. 
The proposed scheme has been simulated to ensure that keys are generated 
with minimum impact on time requirements. The symmetric key generation 
scheme has been tested with four prominent key sizes i.e. 128, 256, 512, 1024 bits 
with increasing PBKDF iterations. Simulation results show that the ICMetric 
technology can be coupled with the PBKDF algorithm with minimum impact on 
running time. The symmetric key generation scheme has been tested in AES 128, 
AES 256 and the Rabbit stream cipher. The proposed symmetric key generation 
scheme has been studied by comparing with a one to one scheme that uses the 
ICMetric technology. The comparison aims to prove that the ICMetric technology 
can be used to create a symmetric key for a group of devices. The proposed 
scheme competes closely with the rivalling scheme and delivers higher levels of 
security without compromise in the running time. 
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Asymmetric key cryptography is an important tool for any cryptographer 
because of the advantages public key cryptography offers compared to symmetric 
key cryptography. Asymmetric key is termed as “asymmetric” owing to the way 
keying elements are held by the individual parties. Asymmetric keys are composed 
of two different keys i.e. a key which is made public and another which is private 
and held only by the owner. It is known that asymmetric key generation can be 
computationally intensive and its use may seem like an inconvenience but infact 
this form of keying possesses qualities which makes this an attractive alternative 
to symmetric keying. Asymmetric key cryptography is very different as compared 
to symmetric key cryptography because asymmetric keys are based on the 
computational intractability like the key generation may be based on unique large 
primes. Asymmetric key cryptography is a fundamental security ingredient for a 
wide range of cryptographic elements like digital signatures, Transport Layer 
Security (TLS), PGP, SSL etc. This chapter studies the generation of an ICMetric 
based asymmetric key using the widely accepted RSA algorithm. Coupling the 
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ICMetric technology with RSA is a novel concept that appreciates the security 
of the RSA algorithm and the target system. The chapter studies the individual 
building blocks of the asymmetric key generation scheme and then details of the 
algorithm are provided. The chapter also provides the simulation and evaluation 
results of the proposed scheme. 
5.1 ASYMMETRIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The idea of using two keys instead of one was first explored in 1976 by 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [142]. Their research formed the basis for a 
range of cryptographic services which we use today like, digital signatures and 
digital certificates. 
Asymmetric key or public key cryptography is based on two keys i.e. a 
public key and a private key. The public key is widely disseminated and is not 
kept secret, while the private key is kept secret and steps should be taken to 
ensure its secrecy. In asymmetric key cryptography the public key and the private 
key possess a unique relationship such that it is mathematically infeasible to 
extract the private key if the public key is available. Although there are many 
individual applications of asymmetric key cryptography, its use can be best 
understood in the encryption decryption process. 
When encrypting using asymmetric keys it must be highlighted that the 
public key is equally accessible to both an ally and aggressor. While the private 
key is kept secret and only the owner is aware of its contents. Figure 5.1 (a) 
shows the first scenario where Alice wishes to send a secret message to Bob. To 
do so Alice will use Bob’s public key to carry out the encryption. Bob will use his 
private key to carry out the decryption. In this setup an attacker is not able to 
carry out the decryption since only Bob’s private key can provide the correct 
plaintext. This scheme ensures that Alice and Bob are able to share a secret 
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without having to share secret keys. Secondly, by using Bob’s public key Alice 
can ensure that only Bob can decrypt the ciphertext. 
Encryption in asymmetric key can also be carried out using a private key. 
Here the challenge is that Bob wants a guarantee that the message was actually 
sent by Alice and not by an impersonating adversary. In such a situation Alice 
will encrypt the message with her private key whereas Bob will use Alice’s Public 
key to decrypt the message. The senders guarantee is provided since the private 
key is only in possession of the sender. Such an arrangement is not meant to offer 
secrecy as Alice’s public key is also available to the adversary. Figure 5.1 (b) 
shows the second case where Alice sends a message to bob by using her own 
private key. A benefit of using this arrangement is that non-repudiation is implied 
if the private key has not been compromised. This type of scenario should be used 
with caution as the public key is accessible to all which means that the message 
can be decrypted even by an adversary. 
 
Figure 5.1. Encryption-decryption process using an asymmetric key (a) 
Encryption with a public key (b) Encryption with a private key 
Alice Bob 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Bob’s public key 
Plaintext Plaintext Ciphertext 
Bob’s private key 
Alice Bob 
Encrypt Decrypt 
Alice’s private key 
Plaintext Plaintext Ciphertext 
Alice’s public key 
(a) 
(b) 
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Definition 5.1. For an encryption and corresponding decryption transformations 
{𝐸𝑒: 𝑒 ∈  𝒦} and {𝐷𝑑: 𝑑 ∈ 𝒦} where 𝒦 is the key space, then under the asymmetric 
key cipher for each associated encryption/decryption pair (𝑒, 𝑑), the key 𝑒 is 
called the public key and the key 𝑑 is called the secret key and for a given 
ciphertext 𝑐, it is computationally infeasible to find a message 𝑚 such that 
𝐸𝑒(𝑚) = 𝑐 [22]. 
5.2 SCHEME PRIMITIVES 
The asymmetric key generation scheme is based on a number of 
cryptographic primitives. Before providing a detailed description of how the 
asymmetric key is generated it is important to throw light on the scheme 
primitives. 
5.2.1 Cryptographically Secure Pseudorandom Number Generator 
Random number generators play an important role in many computer 
applications like cryptography, simulations, games, lottery, etc. The sole purpose 
of a random number generator is to produce random numbers. Randomness can 
have different meanings in different scenarios and applications. For example 
randomness has different meanings when simulating a coin tossing experiment, 
generating a random password, choosing a random back-off period for a 
nonresponsive server. Each of these tasks have their own requirements for a 
random number. 
Although there are many different types of random number generators not 
all are suitable for use in cryptography [143]. Random number generators (RNG) 
can be broadly placed into three categories i.e. True RNG (TRNG), Pseudo RNG 
(PRNG) and Cryptographically Secure PRNG (CSPRNG). Figure 5.2 shows the 
classification of random number generators.  
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Figure 5.2. Classification of RNG into TRNG, PRNG and CSPRNG 
TRNG use unpredictable sources to generate random data. Commonly 
used sources of random data are electrical resistor noise and oscillator phase noise. 
The problem [144] with a TRNG is that they produce data at a low data rate 
typically 20kbps. PRNG use an algorithm for generating a sequence of numbers 
that possess the same properties to those of truly random numbers. The problem 
with PRNG is that they lack uniformity of distribution and there maybe 
correlations between successive values. Often random number generators will fall 
short of some tests of true randomness and statistical analysis. Owing to this the 
use of a PRNG in a cryptosystem is discouraged. 
The noncompliance of TRNG and PRNG to the field of cryptography has 
resulted in the creation of a PRNG which is suitable for use in cryptographic 
applications. CSPRNG are specialized PRNG which are designed to resist 
cryptographic attacks. A CSPRNG holds its security if it fulfils the following 
definition. 
Definition 5.2. Given a sequence of 𝑘 bits generated by a CSPRNG, it should be 
computationally infeasible to predict bit 𝑘 + 1 with confidence greater than 
1
2
. 
Furthermore, if all or part of the internal state of the CSPRNG is revealed, it 
should not be possible to deduce the numbers previously generated [145]. 
There are just a few recognized CSPRNG algorithms for instance the 
CryptGenRandom function [146] is Microsoft’s Cryptographic Application 
programming interface. Mac OS X and iOS devices use the Yarrow algorithm 
RNG 
PRNG TRNG CSPRNG 
CHAPTER 5 
102 
 
[147] in their devices. Another popular CSPRNG algorithm is the Fortuna 
Algorithm [145] which was published in 2003. The OpenSSL cryptographic library 
uses CryptGenRandom function for the creation of random numbers. 
5.2.2 Primality Testing 
The purpose of a primality test is to determine if a number is prime or 
not. Many cryptographic algorithms like the RSA rely heavily on primality 
testing. Primality testing has been a focus of research for a long time because the 
aim has always been to improve the efficiency and correctness of the algorithm. 
Perhaps one of the earliest algorithms on primality testing is the Fermat’s 
primality test which was based on Fermat’s little theorem [148]. Another popular 
primality testing algorithm was the Solovay-Strassen [149] test published in 1977. 
This test was relegated in 1980 with the emergence of the Miller-Rabin [150] test. 
Miller-Rabin test offers better performance with at least the same correctness as 
its precursor. It still remains the most practical and widely used method of 
checking primality even though it is a probabilistic test. The OpenSSL library 
uses the Miller-Rabin test to check for primality. The function is provided in the 
BIGNUM multiprecision integer arithmetic library. The syntax [151] of the 
function is as follows: 
#include <openssl/bn.h> 
int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX 
*ctx, BN_GENCB *cb); 
The basic object in this function is the BIGNUM which is a single large 
integer. This is considered as an opaque data type as the individual fields are not 
directly accessible. The function performs a Rabin-Miller probabilistic primality 
check with nchecks iterations. As the BIGNUM object can be fairly large 
therefore the creation and deletion of BIGNUM instances can be costly. To solve 
this problem the function uses BIGNUM context (BN_CTX) which is composed of 
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a number of temporary BIGNUM linked lists and stacks that hold data 
temporarily. The last parameter required by the function is a callback which 
provides feedback on the progress which is specially required when the number of 
iterations is high. The function has a very low error probability which is less than 
0.25nchecks [152]. 
5.2.3 RSA Algorithm 
The RSA cryptosystem is a result of research [153] by Ron Rivest, Adi 
Shamir and Leonard Adleman. The RSA algorithm still remains the most popular 
and successful algorithm for public key cryptography. Years of cryptanalysis of 
the RSA algorithm has not been able to prove or disprove its security. The RSA 
algorithm was the first algorithm which is based on the primality testing problem 
and the integer factorization problem. 
Definition 5.3. The primality testing problem is a tractable problem and states 
that given a positive integer greater than 1, determine whether or not it is a prime 
[154]. 
Definition 5.4. The integer factorization problem states that given a large positive 
integer 𝑛 > 1 find a factor 1 < 𝑝 < 𝑛 of 𝑛 which satisfies the condition 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞 
where 1 < 𝑞 < 𝑛. The factors 𝑝 and 𝑞 should be large primes. The integer 
factorization problem remains unsolvable in polynomial time [154]. 
The RSA algorithm is composed of three individual components i.e. key 
generation, encryption and decryption. We limit ourselves to the key generation 
component as we modify this algorithm to function with the ICMetric technology. 
The RSA key generation algorithm works as follows: 
1. Generate two large random primes 𝑝 and 𝑞. 
2. Compute the RSA modulus 𝑁 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞. 
3. If 𝜑 is the Euler’s totient function then compute the private exponent. 
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𝜑 (𝑁) = 𝜑(𝑝) 𝜑(𝑞) 
                      = (𝑝 − 1)(𝑞 − 1) 
(12) 
4. Choose an integer 𝑒 such that 1 ≤ 𝑒 ≤ 𝜑(𝑁) i.e. 𝑒 and 𝜑(𝑁) are 
coprimes. 
5. Compute the public exponent 𝑑. 
𝑑 ≡ 𝑒−1(𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑁)) (13) 
The public key exponent 𝑑 is released whereas the private component 𝜑 is kept 
secret. 
The RSA algorithm uses distinct large primes to compute the modulus. At 
this point it is natural to question what would happen if there are no more unique 
primes. Euclid [155] answers this question in his theorem where he proposes that 
there are infinite many primes number. The theorem has been studied and proved 
correct in other researches [156][157]. For a system designer the concern is to 
generate strong enough primes quickly. Obviously, generating large unique primes 
will take more time compared to a smaller arbitrary prime. 
5.3 ASYMMETRIC KEY GENERATION 
The ICMetric based asymmetric key generation scheme uses hashing, 
CSPRNG, primality testing and the RSA algorithm. Once the group ICMetric is 
generated it is hashed and used as a seed to create two CSPRNG. The two primes 
are tested for primality and then used for creating public and private key pairs. 
Given below are the five steps of the proposed asymmetric key generation scheme 
based on ICMetric. 
1. Generate the group ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑔. 
2. Hash the group ICMetric 𝑖𝑐𝑚𝑔 to create a seed of 128 bit length. 
3. Create two cryptographically secure pseudo random numbers by using seed 
in a CSPRNG. 
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4. Test for primality and repeat step 3 until two large primes 𝑝 and 𝑞 are 
obtained. 
5. Process the primes 𝑝 and 𝑞 in the RSA algorithm to generate the public 
and private key pairs. 
Given in figure 5.3 is a flow diagram which shows the sequential flow of the 
proposed asymmetric key generation scheme based on ICMetric. 
 
Figure 5.3. The ICMetric based asymmetric key generation scheme 
5.4 IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES 
The proposed ICMetric based asymmetric key generation scheme has been 
implemented and tested on Intel Core i5 3.4GHz processor computer with 6GB 
RAM. The scheme has been programmed using Bloodshed Dev-C while the 
cryptographic functionalities are provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic library 
[139]. 
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5.4.1 Outcomes 
The proposed system is tested by generating common cryptographic key 
sizes i.e. 128, 512, 1024, 2048 bit. Even though the 128 bit key is a size which is 
not favored owing to fear of being captured, its use is justified as keys are 
periodically regenerated to provide key freshness in the group. Given in figure 5.4 
is the graph giving key generation times for various key sizes. 
 
Figure 5.4. Graph showing time (seconds) taken by the ICMetric based 
RSA scheme to generate keys of size 128, 512, 1024, 2048 bit 
5.4.2 Scheme Analysis 
The proposed scheme presents an asymmetric key generation scheme that 
is based on ICMetric. The scheme offers forward and backward secrecy as a new 
key pair is created whenever a new group ICMetric is generated. In the scheme 
it is assumed that all communications take place via secure channels which helps 
in deterring man in the middle and eavesdropping attacks on the system. 
The scheme is initiated once a group ICMetric is assembled. The group 
ICMetric is hashed to create a seed which is used for generating two large primes 
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required for RSA algorithm. By using a seed for prime generation the scheme 
ensures diversity and unpredictability of primes. The resulting primes are tested 
for primality and then used in the RSA key generation algorithm. The proposed 
scheme can be tailored to any key size that is supported by RSA. Thus the 
presented scheme increases system practicality as varying key sizes can be 
generated based on application requirements. 
5.5 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
This thesis is an effort to secure group communications using the ICMetric 
technology. Previously the ICMetric technology has not been coupled with the 
RSA algorithm. An advantage of coupling the ICMetric technology with RSA is 
that it allows private key encryption with public key decryption. This setup 
provides authentication guarantees to the receiver. This form of authenticated 
message exchange is not provided by PUF. Thus the proposed asymmetric key 
generation scheme can only be compared with recent implementations of the RSA 
algorithm. The proposed scheme can be compared with two schemes that utilize 
the RSA key generation algorithm. The first research by Vijayalakshmi et al. 
[158] is a multiparty key agreement protocol that studies identity based 
authentication with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and RSA. The authors 
study the RSA algorithm and experiment with two keys i.e. 128 bit and 1024 
bits. The authors have not experimented with any other key sizes which is a 
shortcoming of the scheme. The 128 bit key is quite dated, as key sizes have 
increased and the 128 bit key is often considered weak. The work has been 
simulated on an Intel Pentium Dual Core 2.2GHz processor with 2GB RAM. 
The second scheme by Dongjiang et al. [159] studies the RSA algorithm 
for public key cryptography. The authors have proposed methods to improve the 
efficiency of the RSA by incorporating a pre-screening algorithm. The pre-
screening algorithm streamlines the prime number generation module to improve 
performance of the overall RSA key generation. The authors have experimented 
CHAPTER 5 
108 
 
with 1024 bits and 2048 bits to study the improved RSA algorithm. The authors 
have not given the specifications of system on which the simulation was 
conducted. 
The proposed asymmetric key scheme has been simulated with four key 
sizes i.e. 128, 512, 1024, 2048 bit. Table 5.1 provides a running time comparison 
of the ICMetric based asymmetric key generation scheme and two RSA based key 
generation schemes. As the other schemes do not simulate all the key sizes 
therefore absent details have been represented with a dash. 
Table 5.1. A running time (seconds) comparison of the proposed scheme with 
Vijayalakshmi et al. scheme and Dongjiang et al. scheme 
 Proposed scheme 
Vijayalakshmi et 
al. scheme 
Dongjiang et 
al. scheme 
128 bit 5.74 × 10
-2 sec 1.334 × 10-1 sec - 
512 bit 7.42 × 10
-2 sec - - 
1024 bit 1.404 × 10
-1 sec 4.001 × 10-1 sec 8.8 × 10-2 sec 
2048 bit 5.696 × 10
-1 sec - 1.84 × 10-1 sec 
By analysing the tabulated running times it can be concluded that the 
ICMetric technology offers a secure method of supporting key generation with 
minimum impact on running time. The proposed scheme does not outperform 
rivalling schemes but the performance difference is minute which is why it should 
not have a significant impact on the practicality of the resulting system. The 
extra running time can be justified when one considers the benefits ICMetric 
technology offers compared to conventional cryptographic systems. 
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5.6 SUMMARY 
The ICMetric technology can be used for the provision of cryptographic 
services. Many modern cryptographic systems are based on using asymmetric 
keys to provide security. This chapter studies the ICMetric technology as a basis 
for asymmetric key generation. Asymmetric key cryptography uses a combination 
of public and private keys for the provision of cryptographic services. Asymmetric 
keys have become a popular keying mechanisms because of the way the keys are 
held by the owner and the public. A security algorithm that has been able to 
resist a wide range of attacks is the RSA algorithm. The RSA algorithm is the 
most widely used asymmetric key cryptosystem. The popularity of the RSA 
technology encourages the creation of an algorithm that combines both the 
ICMetric technology and the RSA algorithm. 
The strength of the RSA algorithm lies in the generation of two large 
primes which are used for computing a modulus. Even though the security of the 
algorithm lies in the largeness of the primes, one cannot deny the fact that keeping 
the keys secret once they are generated is an essential part of ensuring secrecy of 
the cryptosystem. If the private key is captured then an RSA based system is 
fully exposed. The ICMetric technology enhances the security of RSA through 
the use of key theft deterrence. 
This chapter has studied the unification of the ICMetric technology and 
RSA for security in a multiparty environment. The proposed algorithm provides 
a method of generating a public private key pair based on the ICMetric 
technology. The algorithm uses the group ICMetric, hashing, cryptographically 
secure pseudo random number generators, primality testing and the RSA 
algorithm to create an asymmetric key pair for the group. Efforts have been made 
to ensure that the ICMetric technology works seamlessly with the RSA algorithm 
so that security and practicality of the resulting system is enhanced. Owing to 
the sound design of the RSA, the algorithm has not been modified to make it 
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adapt to the ICMetric technology. An advantage of coupling the ICMetric 
technology with RSA is that the recipient of an encrypted message can 
authenticate the sender. This form of authentication is rooted on the key theft 
deterrent quality of the ICMetric technology. 
The proposed scheme has been simulated to ensure that keys are generated 
with minimum impact on time requirements. The asymmetric key generation 
scheme has been tested with four prominent key sizes i.e. 128, 512, 1024, 2048 
bits. Simulation results show that the ICMetric technology can be coupled with 
the RSA algorithm with minimum impact on running time. The simulation results 
have been compared with two recent researches. Analysis shows that the proposed 
scheme requires slight more time to operate but also offers more security owing 
to which its use can be justified in multiparty environments. 
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Designing provably secure cryptographic schemes is a difficult task because 
security is often achieved at the cost of reduced efficiency. The task becomes even 
more complex when it is both difficult to predict and simulate the amount of 
resources available to an adversary. Cryptographic algorithms are a sequence of 
activities that follow a defined order. Hence cryptographic workflow is a necessary 
part of ensuring that the system functions as intended. Therefore research often 
uses mathematical intractability to prove the security of an algorithm. This 
chapter presents a security analysis of the ICMetric technology and its interaction 
with cryptographic elements used in various modules throughout the thesis. 
This chapter proves that the ICMetric technology supports and enhances 
the security of primitives and the proposed system. Unifying multiple systems 
does not guarantee a sufficiently secure system as adversaries may attempt to 
exploit unpredictable weakness in the schemes. This chapter proves that the 
schemes presented in this thesis do not contradict each other and that the 
properties of the ICMetric technology are also preserved. This chapter studies the 
proposed schemes in the standard model and uses security proofs to shows that 
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the ICMetric technology works hand in hand with cryptographic schemes and 
primitives for the creation of a secure multiparty communication framework. 
6.1 PROVING SECURITY 
The simulation of a security algorithm can give insight into how the 
individual algorithmic elements interact and the time required by the algorithm. 
A guarantee limited to these two factors is not sufficient to prove the security of 
a cryptographic algorithm. A cryptosystem can be subjected to security analysis 
by following one of two standard models i.e. the Random Oracle Model (ROM) 
or the Standard Model. When testing cryptographic schemes it is often difficult 
to predict how an adversary will behave and what resources it has available. This 
serves as a motivation to model stronger adversaries so that highly secure 
cryptosystems can be constructed. 
The ROM [160][161] gives heuristic confidence in the design soundness of 
a cryptographic scheme. The design soundness of an algorithm shows that the 
individual building blocks work together but this does not shows how an 
algorithm would behave in the real world. Owing to the lack of ability to model 
real world scenarios, theoretical and practical research on cryptography is often 
based on the Standard model [162][163]. 
Proving the security of a cryptosystem is a complex task especially when 
it is not always obvious how much resources an adversary will have to attack the 
system. Therefore research often uses mathematical intractability to prove the 
security of an algorithm. The security of popular algorithms like the RSA is still 
based on the intractability of the integer factorization problem [164]. The security 
of a cryptographic scheme can be proved under the standard model by 
deliberately modelling the presence of an adversary which is able to break down 
the scheme and its primitives. All legitimate parties are expected to behave 
according to the defined algorithm. Thus to an onlooker the legitimate parties 
follow an algorithm exactly as they would in real world. An advantage of the 
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standard model is that it allows the replication of interactions following the 
precise mathematical procedures and sequence as defined in the algorithm. 
6.2 FORMAL PROOFS IN THE STANDARD MODEL 
Provable security was first studied in 1989 by Shafi Goldwasser and Yael 
Tauman [165]. Provable security is the process of justifying the security of a 
cryptographic scheme in the presence of an adversary. To prove security, well 
studied atomic primitives are chosen that form building blocks of the scheme. It 
is then demonstrated that the security scheme “works” through reductions. The 
reductions show that the only way to break the scheme is by breaking the atomic 
primitive. A benefit of carrying out such an exercise is that there is no need to 
perform a cryptanalysis of the scheme as it is based on a provably secure atomic 
primitive. If the latter is secure then it can be inferred that the underlying scheme 
is also secure [166]. 
A cryptographic proof under the standard model has two essential elements i.e. 
an adversary model and a security proof. 
• Adversary model - The adversary model is a formal definition of the 
adversary. The model defines if the adversary is passive or active while 
carrying out an attack. 
• Security proof - The security is composed of what elements an adversary 
has access to. The security proof also defines the starting point of 
interactions and when an adversary has broken the cryptosystem. The 
security proof is composed of a challenger who challenges the adversary to 
break the cryptosystem when it is given access to information and 
elements. Outcomes of the security proof are used to determine the extent 
of damage if certain pieces of information are exposed to the adversary. 
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6.2.1 ICMetric Security 
When working with the ICMetric technology it is important to prove that 
it offers higher levels of security compared to conventional cryptography. The 
ICMetric of a device cannot be transmitted which leaves just one possibility of 
capturing this unique device identity i.e. recreating the ICMetric if an attacker 
has access to a subset of device features. If an attacker is able to forge/ recreate 
all the features of a device then generating the ICMetric of the device is an 
effortless task. In this section a security proof is provided which demonstrates the 
security of the ICMetric technology. 
Suppose 𝒞 is a finite set of credentials (explicit and implicit features) 
required for the generation of a device ICMetric. It is known that each device has 
its own credentials 𝑐 ∈  𝒞. 
The ICMetric generation is a deterministic algorithm. When the correct 
set of credentials 𝑐 are presented to the ICMetric generation algorithm Θ then it 
returns a single ICMetric which can uniquely identify that system. 
6.2.1.1  ICMetric Producibility 
Based on observation of device behaviour an adversary may 
attempt to predict the feature of device to forge a device ICMetric. The 
notion of producibility requires that it should be difficult for an adversary 
to produce the device ICMetric such that he has access to some device 
features. All interactions happen between the challenger 𝐶ℎ and an 
adversary 𝒜. 
Security Proof 
Let Θ be an ICMetric generation algorithm that takes as input a set of 
explicit and implicit features 𝑐 ∈  𝒞. The algorithm produces (within 
polynomial time) a unique device ICMetric 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑. 
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Setup Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ generates its credentials 𝑐 ∈  𝒞 under a 
standard stimulus. 
Challenge Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ sends the subset 𝑐1 ∈ 𝑐 to the 
adversary 𝒜 along with the ICMetric generation oracle. The adversary 𝒜 
receives 𝑐1 and the ICMetric oracle. The adversary uses illicit software and 
hardware to produce 𝑐𝑎𝑑 such that it has knowledge of 𝑐1. The adversary 𝒜 
sends the set 𝑐𝑎𝑑 to the challenger 𝐶ℎ. 
Outcome Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ receives 𝑐𝑎𝑑. The challenger now 
provides outcome 𝑂 such that 𝑂 ∈  {0,1}. The determination of 𝑂 is as 
follows: 
If 𝑐𝑎𝑑 ⊆ 𝑐 then output 𝑂 = 0  
If 𝑐𝑎𝑑 ⊂ 𝑐 then output 𝑂 = 1 
Therefore if 𝑂 = 1 the adversary 𝒜 has been unsuccessful in producing the 
credentials 𝑐 thus the challenger 𝐶ℎ has won. 
As the ICMetric generation is based on a large number of explicit and 
implicit features therefore it is difficult for an attacker to forge an 
ICMetric. By using illicit hardware and software tools an adversary may 
capture some features, but cannot capture the entire feature set as the 
ICMetric is based on explicit and implicit features. Many of the features 
are physically unclonable which will deter feature theft. 
6.2.1.2  ICMetric Preimage Hash Resistance 
Hashing is one of the most widely used cryptographic tool. It is 
important to show that by using the ICMetric technology with hashing 
does not violate the properties of both the ICMetric technology and hash 
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functions. Perhaps the greatest concern when using hashing with ICMetric 
is the possibility of illicitly extracting a device ICMetric from its hash 
image. Formally called the preimage hash resistance property, it dictates 
that given a hash function ℎ ∶  𝒳 → 𝒴 find 𝑥 ∈ 𝒳 where 𝑦 ∈ 𝒴 and ℎ(𝑥) =
𝑦. Interactions take place between a challenger 𝐶ℎ and an adversary 𝒜. 
Security Proof 
Let Θ be an ICMetric generation algorithm that takes as input a 
set of explicit and implicit features 𝑐 ∈  𝒞. A publically available hash 
function ℎ that is known both to the challenger 𝐶ℎ and the adversary 𝒜.  
Setup Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ communicates to the adversary 𝒜 the 
hash image 𝑦 obtained by hashing its own ICMetric 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑. 
𝑦 = ℎ(𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑) (14) 
Challenge Phase. The adversary 𝒜 generates an ICMetric 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑
′  based on 
a set of features. The adversary then computes ℎ(𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑
′ ) = 𝑦′. The 
obtained hash image 𝑦′ is communicated to the challenger 𝐶ℎ. 
Outcome Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ receives 𝑦′ and provides an outcome 
𝑂. The outcome 𝑂 ∈  {0,1} is determined as follows: 
If 𝑦′ ≡ 𝑦 then output 𝑂 = 0  
If 𝑦′ ≢ 𝑦 then output 𝑂 = 1 
Therefore if 𝑂 = 1 the adversary 𝒜 has been unsuccessful in extracting the 
ICMetric of a device when it had access to the hash image of the ICMetric 
thus the challenger 𝐶ℎ has won. 
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If the output of an 𝑛-bit hash function has been provided then producing 
a preimage requires approximately 2𝑛 operations which makes the task 
computationally infeasible [167]. 
6.2.2 Device Authentication 
Using ICMetric as a method of facilitating authentication requires that 
systems are able to authenticate each other without transmitting their own 
ICMetric in its pure form. Since the ICMetric of a device cannot be transmitted 
then a challenge is to ensure that genuine entities gain access to the group. The 
purpose of this security proof is to demonstrate that it is not possible for an 
adversary to produce or assume a fake ICMetric and then act like a genuine 
entity. The interactions take place between a challenger 𝐶ℎ and an adversary 𝒜 
in the presence of a key generation centre 𝑘𝑔. 
Security Proof 
Let Θ be an ICMetric generation algorithm that takes as input a set of 
explicit and implicit features 𝑐 ∈  𝒞. A publically available hash function ℎ that 
is known both to the challenger 𝐶ℎ and the adversary 𝒜. 
Setup Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ communicates a hash of his ICMetric 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑 to 
the key generation centre 𝑘𝑔 as follows. 
𝑎 = ℎ(𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑) (15) 
The challenger 𝐶ℎ is issued a temporary salt by the key generation centre 𝑘𝑔. 
The challenger 𝐶ℎ receives the temporary salt 𝑠 and communicates it to adversary 
𝒜. 
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Challenge Phase. The adversary 𝒜 is allowed to communicate with the 𝑘𝑔 for 
authentication. The adversary 𝒜 computes its version of equation 10 to produce 
𝑎′ by producing an ICMetric 𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑
′  from a set of features. 
𝑎′ = ℎ(𝐼𝐶𝑀𝑑
′ ) (16) 
The computed 𝑎′ is communicated to the key generation centre 𝑘𝑔. 
Outcome Phase. The key generation centre 𝑘𝑔 will provide outcome as follows: 
The key generation centre 𝑘𝑔 will independently compute the following based on 
inputs from the challenger  𝐶ℎ and the adversary 𝒜: 
𝑎2 = ℎ(𝑎 + 𝑠) 
𝑎3 = ℎ(𝑎
′ + 𝑠) 
The outcome 𝑂 ∈  {0,1} is determined as follows: 
If 𝑎2 ≡ 𝑎3 then output 𝑂 = 0  
If 𝑎2 ≢ 𝑎3 then output 𝑂 = 1 
Therefore if 𝑂 = 1 the adversary 𝒜 has been unsuccessful in getting itself 
authenticated in place of the challenger 𝐶ℎ in which case the challenger 𝐶ℎ has 
won. 
ICMetric based authentication is based on the secrecy of the ICMetric of 
a device. Since the ICMetric of a device is kept secret therefore any computation 
involving the ICMetric of the device makes the computation indeterministic. 
6.2.3 Key Freshness 
Using the ICMetric as a basis for key generation in a multiparty 
environment requires that the keys are kept secret and that perfect forward and 
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backward secrecy is ensured. These cryptographic properties safeguard the group 
from misuse of keys by entities that are part of or have been part of the group. 
6.2.3.1 Perfect Forward Secrecy  
Perfect forward secrecy in a group environment requires that once a 
member leaves a group he does not have access to ongoing communications and 
keys of the group produced thereafter. The interactions take place between a 
challenger 𝐶ℎ and a group member 𝑖 where 𝑖 ∈ ℕ (later termed as an adversary 
𝒜). 
Security Proof 
Let Θ be an ICMetric generation algorithm. An ICMetric key generation 
algorithm 𝛿 is used to generate a symmetric key or asymmetric key for 𝑛 
participants in the group. 
Setup Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ, at random selects two encrypted messages 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘(𝑚0), 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘(𝑚1), where 𝑘 represents the group key and sends them to the 
group member 𝑖. On receiving the encrypted messages sent by the challenger 𝐶ℎ, 
the group member 𝑖 decrypts the messages using the same group key 𝑘. The group 
member 𝑖 terminates his membership following which he is no longer a member 
of the group and is classified as adversary 𝒜. The group key 𝑘 is revoked and a 
new key 𝑘′ is generated. 
Challenge Phase. The adversary 𝒜 is allowed to generate two messages 𝑚0
′ , 𝑚1
′  
and send them to the challenger 𝐶ℎ. The selection of the messages is made such 
that: 
𝑚0
′ , 𝑚1
′  ∈ {𝑚0, 𝑚1} and  𝑚0
′  ≠ 𝑚1
′  
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The challenger 𝐶ℎ tosses a fair coin 𝑏 ← {0,1} and encrypts the message 𝑚𝑏
′  with 
the key 𝑘′ and send it to the adversary 𝒜. 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘′(𝑚𝑏
′ ) 
Outcome Phase. The adversary 𝒜 receives the encrypted message. By analysing 
this newly generated message against the previously stored messages 𝑚0, 𝑚1, the 
adversary 𝒜 has to guess and output bit 𝑏. The adversary 𝒜 wins if the bit 𝑏 is 
guessed correctly otherwise the scheme provides perfect forward secrecy. 
Therefore, the probability that the adversary 𝒜 wins is 
1
2
. 
6.2.3.2 Perfect Backward Secrecy 
Perfect backward secrecy in a group environment requires that once a 
party joins a group it does not have access to communications and keys utilized 
prior to its introduction into the group. The interactions happen between a 
challenger 𝐶ℎ and a group member 𝑖 where 𝑖 ∈ ℕ. 
Security Proof 
Let Θ be an ICMetric generation algorithm. An ICMetric key generation 
algorithm 𝛿 is used to generate a symmetric key or asymmetric key for 𝑛 
participants in the group. 
Setup Phase. There are 𝑛 participants in the group who share a common group 
key 𝑘𝑗  where 𝑗 ∈  ℕ. The participants encrypt and decrypt messages using the key 
𝑘𝑗. Challenger 𝐶ℎ maintains a history of all past encrypted messages 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘𝑗(𝑚). 
A dishonest group member 𝑖 (hereafter called the adversary 𝒜) joins the group. 
The group key 𝑘𝑗 is revoked and a new key 𝑘𝑗+1 is created. 
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Phase I. The adversary 𝒜 encrypts and decrypts messages in the group using the 
group key 𝑘𝑗+1. 
Challenge Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ selects an encrypted message 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑘𝑗(𝑚) from 
his history and sends it to the adversary 𝒜. The adversary 𝒜 executes phase I 
again. 
Outcome Phase. The adversary 𝒜 wins if he is able to output the decrypted 
message 𝑚 or guess the associated plain text. Thus the adversary must correctly 
output 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑘𝑗(𝑚) to show that the system is penetrated. 
When the adversary joins the group the previous keys are revoked and new keys 
are issued. This feature ensures backward secrecy and prevents access to previous 
communications of the group. 
6.2.4 Compromised Client 
A concern when communicating in group communications is the presence of 
compromised or dishonest participants. In these circumstances there is an issue 
that the secrecy of the ICMetric and the cryptographic keys will not be 
maintained. 
Security Proof 
Let Θ be an ICMetric generation algorithm. An ICMetric key generation 
algorithm 𝛿 is used to generate a symmetric key or asymmetric key for 𝑛 
participants in the group. 
Setup Phase. There are 𝑛 participants in the group who share a common group 
key 𝑘𝑗  where 𝑗 ∈  ℕ. A group member 𝑖 has been unknowingly compromised owing 
to which his communications are being captured by an active adversary 𝒜. 
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Phase I. The adversary 𝒜 encrypts and decrypts messages in the group using 
current the group key 𝑘𝑗. 
Challenge Phase. The challenger 𝐶ℎ sends an encrypted challenge-response test 
to group member 𝑖 and the adversary 𝒜. As the adversary and the group member 
have access to the same key therefore they will reply with a response message. 
Outcome Phase. The group member 𝑖 responds to the challenge with a message 
𝑚𝑏 . While the adversary 𝒜 responds with message 𝑚𝑏′ The adversary 𝒜 wins if 
the responses obtained are identical. Thus the outcome 𝑂 ∈  {0,1} is determined 
as follows: 
If 𝑚𝑏 ≡ 𝑚𝑏′ then output 𝑂 = 0  
If 𝑚𝑏 ≢ 𝑚𝑏′ then output 𝑂 = 1 
Therefore if 𝑂 = 1 the adversary 𝒜 has been unsuccessful in getting access to the 
group and its communications in which case the challenger 𝐶ℎ has won. 
ICMetric based authentication is based on the secrecy of the ICMetric of 
a device. If a group member is compromised then the device ICMetric and group 
ICMetric can be exposed which can result in authentication abuse and 
cryptographic key theft. 
6.3 SUMMARY 
Designing a cryptosystem by incorporating popular cryptographic 
primitives does not provide sufficient security guarantees. Although the stability 
of the individual primitives is often well understood the same cannot be said 
about their interactions with other primitives. The ICMetric technology provides 
a reliable root of trust upon which a cryptographic scheme can be built. When 
using the ICMetric technology with security primitives it is important to ensure 
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that the design does not possess any technical flaw which could be exploited by 
an adversary to bring down the system. The various schemes presented in earlier 
chapters are based on strong atomic primitives. No doubt some schemes would 
continue functioning even if the atomic primitive was removed, but it must be 
highlighted that the primitives have been incorporated to provide higher level of 
security. 
This chapter uses the standard model to prove that interactions between 
the scheme elements do not violate the cryptographic and ICMetric technology 
goals. There are many methods of proving security but often they do not model 
the physical world correctly. Security proofs have been designed in the standard 
model because this method accurately models scheme elements in the presence of 
an adversary. 
Security proofs show that the ICMetric cannot be produced by an 
adversary even if a subset of features are disclosed to it. As the ICMetric of a 
device is never transmitted in its original form therefore a security proof 
demonstrates that it is not possible to capture an ICMetric if a hash is provided. 
After establishing security of the ICMetric technology the chapter shows that an 
adversary cannot exploit the authentication algorithm to gain unlawful admission 
to the group. This security proof also demonstrates that the ICMetric technology 
can be uniquely used to identify a device. 
The aim of this thesis was to establish that the ICMetric technology can 
be used to generate keys for the group environment. Generating keys for a group 
requires that key freshness is maintained along with perfect forward and 
backward secrecy. As the schemes have been designed to function in the 
multiparty environment therefore it is important to ensure that the keys are kept 
secret when a group member joins or leaves the group. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
 
Cryptographic schemes and algorithms are tools that are used to protect 
users, devices and data. Users are becoming increasingly dependent on sharing 
data and they assume that their devices and data are safe from adversaries. 
Therefore it is the responsibility of the designers and manufacturers to ensure 
that this is the case. At present some devices for environments like the IoT are 
being designed and manufactured with little or no security provisions. This thesis 
has studied the security of devices communicating in a group environment such 
as IoT. The thesis studies incorporating the ICMetric technology as a key theft 
deterrent and a basis for a range of cryptographic services. This chapter provides 
a summary of contributions that were aimed at revolutionizing the security of 
devices in the multiparty environment. 
7.1 PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
In this thesis the security of devices in the multiparty environment has 
been studied. A testbed of wearable Shimmer sensors has been used for studying 
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features suitable for ICMetric generation. The cryptographic services have been 
simulated in C-language using the OpenSSL cryptographic library. 
The proposed schemes could be practically implemented on many network 
capable systems like wearable devices, smartphones, tablets and laptops. Some 
portable devices may not be able to support cryptographic services as they often 
lack power and processing capabilities required by cryptographic primitives. A 
necessary requirement for using the proposed ICMetric generation is that the 
target device must be embedded with MEMS based inertial sensors. 
7.2 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
The security of cryptographic schemes lies in keeping the key secret while 
the scheme is made public. The Kerckhoff’s principle states that “only secrecy of 
the key provides security”. This implies that cryptographic key theft can be the 
breaking point of any security system. The cryptographic key is a necessary piece 
of information which is able to ensure the security of the system. Typically a 
cryptographic key is a hexadecimal block of data that can range from 80 bit to 
beyond 256 bit in size. The cryptographic keys are never memorized owing to 
their size and data type which is why they are often stored on the system so they 
can be retrieved when needed [31]. If the keys are stored in a retrieval system 
then they can be attacked by an adversary through many methods. The many 
methods of attacks on various forms of computation devices are discussed in 
chapter 2. The chapter also studies cryptographic key theft as a fundamental 
problem in cryptography. This problem remains largely unexplored and can be 
referred to as an Achilles heel in a cryptographic system. Increasing key size can 
only reduce brute force attacks on keys [8] but does not entirely eliminate the 
possibility of key theft. To create stronger cryptosystems cryptographers now 
consider alternate roots of trust like PUF’s, machine fingerprinting. 
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This thesis explores the use of ICMetric technology as a key theft deterrent 
and as a basis for security provision in a group setting. The ICMetric technology 
allows the creation of a device identification by using the features of the device. 
This device identification is then used for authentication and also to generate 
symmetric and asymmetric keys for the group. The ICMetric technology functions 
as a key theft deterrent because the key is only generated when required and 
discarded thereafter. This means that for an adversary aiming to capture a key 
there is nothing to attack or capture. 
Analysis of commonly used features for device fingerprinting shows that 
many device fingerprinting based systems offer a false guarantee of security as 
the features they use can be easily captured and spoofed. In chapter 3 the 
Shimmer sensor has been used to study features that are suitable for ICMetric 
generation. Hence the first contribution of this thesis is an in-depth study of 
explicit and implicit features of a device which can used for ICMetric generation. 
The thesis proposes that the ICMetric of a device can be based on the bias in 
MEMS accelerometer, gyroscope and strain gauge sensors. Statistical analysis of 
the sensors readings showed that each sensor possesses a unique bias which can 
be used for ICMetric generation. The chapter also presents a study on explicit 
features which are relatively easy to generate but can uniquely identify a device. 
In Chapter 3 the concept of the group ICMetric has been presented. The 
group ICMetric is an identity of the group and is used to identify groups of 
communicating devices. Hence the second contribution of this thesis is a group 
ICMetric generation scheme that is based on Shamir Secret Sharing. The scheme 
allows a group of devices to generate a group identity which can be used for the 
provision of security services like key generation. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis demonstrates the fact that the ICMetric technology 
can be used to create cryptographic keys. The third contribution of this thesis is 
a symmetric key generation scheme that is based on PBKDF [134]. The PBKDF 
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algorithm is based on an iteration count that can be increased or decreased based 
on the complexity of the system. Coupling the ICMetric technology and the 
PBKDF allows the creation of a strong symmetric key for the group environment. 
The proposed algorithm can be adapted to various key sizes by modification of 
the key size parameter taken by the function. 
The thesis also establishes that the ICMetric technology can be used to 
create an asymmetric key. Chapter 5 studies public key cryptography in relation 
with the ICMetric technology. Asymmetric key cryptography is often favoured 
over symmetric keys due to the unique way they execute but are more resource 
intensive compared to symmetric keys. Hence the fourth contribution of the 
research is an ICMetric based asymmetric key generation scheme that creates 
keys with minimum overhead. The RSA algorithm is one of the most widely used 
asymmetric key generation algorithms because of its non-tractable algorithm. By 
using the RSA with ICMetric the resulting scheme creates an asymmetric key 
without compromising system security or the security of the algorithms involved. 
Founding the design of any scheme on popular primitives does not 
guarantee a secure system. Therefore it is important to test a scheme for 
conformance to high levels of security. Hence any scheme that is proposed should 
be resilient to attacks on the individual components and their interactions. 
Chapter 6 studies the proposed ICMetric and key generation schemes through 
the standard model. By using the standard model interactions take place such 
that certain pieces of information are shared with the adversary so that the 
system can be attacked. The standard model is used the study the extent of 
damage if crucial pieces of information are exposed to an adversary. 
7.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
It can be said that internal attacks are difficult to prevent, as trusted 
parties abuse their access rights to attack a system. By incorporating the latest 
features into an ICMetric, better intrusion detection systems can be designed. 
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The thesis has demonstrated the creation of an ICMetric by using various explicit 
and implicit device features. By no means are the presented features an exhaustive 
list. Therefore research should be aimed at the discovery of more features which 
can strengthen the ICMetric of a device. Incorporating network, operating system 
and web browser characteristics into the ICMetric technology can be a novel way 
of detecting both internal and external intrusions. The ICMetric technology can 
also be studies as a physically unclonable function thus promoting its use in areas 
outside cryptography. 
As mentioned in chapter three the MEMS sensors are susceptible to 
varying behaviour due to environmental factors, fatigue, stress and aging 
[126][127][128]. The effect of these factors needs to be studied for reducing impact 
on the ICMetric generation process. Incorporation of correction codes into the 
ICMetric generation process can be used to significantly lower the impact of 
external factors on MEMS sensors. 
The ICMetric technology does not possess self-correcting properties. Thus 
when a device ICMetric is being generated, erroneous bits due to environmental 
variations [168] will influence the resulting ICMetric. To correct this a self-
correcting code will ensure robustness and stability of both the ICMetric and the 
resulting cryptographic keys. 
The group ICMetric uniquely identifies a group of communicating devices. 
Efficient and secure methods are required that allow the generation of a group 
ICMetric without compromising the security of the ICMetric technology. 
Multiparty computations provide a method for communicating parties to generate 
a function over secret inputs. The concept can be incorporated into the group 
ICMetric generation process. Multiparty computations are often based on very 
simple arithmetic algorithms that use intractability for secrecy. This concept can 
be very effective for computing the group ICMetric. 
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Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public key approach, which has 
attracted a lot of attention owing to the advantages it offers over RSA based 
cryptosystems [169]. ECC can be used in portable and wireless devices because it 
carries out key generation, signatures, encryption and decryption better than 
RSA. Thus the ICMetric technology can be studied with ECC for improved 
performance and security. 
For improved security and practicality, the ICMetric technology can be 
implemented as a System-on-Chip. Previous experiments [170] on hardware 
implementations of the ICMetric technology did not include programmable single 
board computing devices. Further experiments can include implementing the 
ICMetric technology using ARM microprocessor, PIC microcontroller, Atmel 
microcontrollers etc. Integration of various MEMS sensors and hardware 
implementation of ICMetric can be used to detect physical attacks on 
computation systems. 
Cryptocurrencies and electronic payment systems are rapidly becoming 
part of daily life. The ICMetric technology has not been studied in block chains 
and Bitcoins. Bitcoins are not anonymous [171] by design which can present a 
weakness. This implies that people can find out who is using bitcoin and how 
they are spending them. If the ICMetric technology is integrated into bitcoin then 
it can provide both anonymity and promote secrecy of transactions. 
This thesis has demonstrated that integrating the ICMetric technology 
into a wearable device will improve the safety, security and privacy of both the 
device and its wearer. Studies have shown that it is possible to authenticate a 
person through gait recognition and even through their heart beat. It would be 
interesting to study the ICMetric technology merged with the biometric security. 
Such a combination would create a system that can secure both the device and 
its owner. 
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Self-driving and smart vehicles get their intelligence from on-board 
computation and communication systems. A hurdle in the adoption of smart 
vehicles is their security. Smart vehicles are equipped with an overwhelming 
number of sensors and chips that monitor the vehicle behaviour at every instance. 
The ICMetric technology can use these sensors to offer security to these unique 
systems. A merger of ICMetric technology and smart vehicles has the ability to 
offer unprecedented security that cannot be promised with conventional 
cryptographic systems. 
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